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Martin Heidegger, Rector:
The Enigmas of 1933

E. M. Carmichael
Martin Heidegger had two lives. There was Martin Heidegger as revealed in the philosophical texts, primarily *Sein und Zeit (Being and Time)*, published in 1927. There was Martin Heidegger as concealed in the political texts, commencing the 18th of May, 1933, with a short address delivered to students at the University of Freiburg. Neither self (or identity) makes sense without the other, not at the moment of their appearance nor today, and if we should ask, as I believe we must, where or how we would discover the man Heidegger, or rather, if we were to articulate the relationships between the texts representing the author and his personal history, the responses can never satisfy us. To this one note should be added: that the Heidegger searching for understanding in the work following *Sein und Zeit* and particularly in the post-war period, the Heidegger of everdarkening forests, narrowing paths, of precipices, punishments that will not cease, that is, the Heidegger who speaks through the poetry of Hölderlin, who orders then breaks our silence by the long interrogation held with the poet. In the Spring of 1933 Heidegger was elected rector of the University of Freiburg, located in the former province of Baden. This was at a time when the nazi 'form' was fleshing out and gathering force and at a time therefore when its messengers were seeking greater accommodation, support, and above all, greater voice in its INCEPTION within Germany as the party of revolution. Nazism needed the honor of a based constituent voice. In the pages to follow I shall present and comment on certain passages of what is known as the *Rector's Address* delivered by Heidegger the 27th of May, 1933, as part of the program to celebrate his institution's university festival. Context can be twisted to meet specification. But one figure can stand alone without the call for redress. In Baden there were, and again we are speaking of 1933, two concentration camps, both in the town of Heuberg, built for the incarceration of politically harmful persons, namely communists, pacifists, and social democrats, who were destined for later transfer to and thus extermination at Dachau.

The setting does not lack for color, for mass, eminence or character. Attending were the Ministers of Justice and Culture of Baden, the Archbishop of Freiburg, notables of other universities, a certain von Gallwitz, retired artillery general; and a captive array of students, who included nazi militants (SA) formalized under the swastika banner, surrounded this spirited band. The musical program itself provides us with the tone that organizers must have delibe-
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rated at length: the Brahms overture Gaudeamus Igitur, Wagner's Huldigung March, Hymn To The National Socialist Martyr Horst Wessel, and Song of Germany. Transmission of the speech was broadcast by Freiburg Radio. Heidegger entitled it 'The Self-Assertion of The German University'. Excerpting the major declaration of this most declarative work of inspiration while commenting on what I take as their essential mark is not without risks. It does however point us straight at fundamental issues. Translation (mine) into English is denoted here by italics. Heidegger's own italics are rendered in upper case.

Taking charge of the rectorate means to take the responsibility of guiding this fine school SPIRITUALLY. Those who will follow, students and professors alike, owe their existence and their vitality to their common root within the essence itself of the German university. This essence does not attain clarity at the level and force proper to it unless, from the first and at all times, the guides are themselves guided—guided by the inflexibility of this spiritual mission, a mission whose constraints express the very character of the German people's historical destiny.

Heidegger, we see, does not pose as the Führer of the institution except as Führer among others elected to the same role(s). The importance of the notion Führer is made even more crucial in the national design to which the "subjects" (students and their professors) are appropriated. One does not belong to a school as much as to a force that overwhelms the particular and exalts the collectivity. Hence the educator cannot assume individual status. Rather he must be shared, having been entrusted with the mission of carrying on what supercedes his capacity. Heidegger invokes the transcendent again in the figure of inflexibility: we should read will-to-face-and-resist the temptation to deviate from the paths that lead outward from the center, the German national center or essence. Heidegger places himself at that point in no-time, the latter because the commencement towards history and event originates now in the spoken convenant to which the address is, we may say, devoted. The emphasis is on project. But true to Heideggerian style, constraint is loaded into the charge. He does not outline a concrete obstacle. For the concreteness comes loaded in the pressure-chamber of the expression, constraint. Clarity lies alongside. Light is not transparent but a variant or an interval that must be registered in accord-
ance with the rules (forms) or results of the constraint. Who defines that constraint and by what principles? If we follow the sense given here, the source which radiates is transcendent and historic: the politics which ennobles and must be seized in its inception.

Are we capable of rising to this challenge? Whether we are or not, the question still remains: are we, the teaching staff and student body who make up this fine institution, truly and as a community rooted in the essence of the German university? Does this essence possess in authenticity the force necessary to put its mark on our existence? It so, it is by virtue of its being deeply DESIRED by us. But who would doubt this? We can see as a community that the essential and prevailing character of the university lies in its independence, which must be maintained. Yet have we really considered what this demand for independence requires of us? For independence means: taking upon ourselves the task and determining for ourselves the means and the terms of its realization. But do we know WHO WE ARE OURSELVES, WE, in other words, the teaching and student bodies of the university, the finest of the German people's educational institutions. Is it even possible for us to know this without the most constant and disciplined self-meditation?

What puzzles at first reading is the vehemence of the address, its spirit of exhortation, measured against the apparent conventionality of its language, part directive, part homily, achieved by the use of interrogative (always in cadence) devices. I would choose to point attention, first, at the other side of 'Independence' presented by Heidegger, for while he does make the case for the autonomous university, the capacities and worthiness required of 'US' to reach and sustain successful independence are never conceded out of hand. In the guise of teacher rather than judge, accused rather than accuser, Heidegger will wait to set the conditions of their release (revalidation). He will also force the choices available by positing the ground and very justification of the mission to be carried forward (forward and out) in the triad, national origins-national destiny-science, which founds in its most elemental state the REVOLUTIONARY project of the nascent nazi regime:

The self-assertion of the German university lies in the original and
common willing of its essence. For us the German university stands as that lofty institution which, based on and developed through science, educates and elevates the guides and guardians of the destiny of the German people. To will the essence of the German people is to will science in the sense of willing the historic spiritual mission of the German people as a people which sees and understands itself in its State. Science and German destiny must in this willing of essence, reach full force AT THE SAME TIME. And this is what will come about if, and only if, ON THE ONE HAND, we of the community of professors and teachers, rereveal to science its innermost necessity while, ON THE OTHER, we ourselves endure the German destiny in its most extreme distress.

Astonishing declaration should we ask to what this science, embraced in its essence, aspires and probe the possible significance of the words, "at the same time". Heidegger does not shrink from the rigors of possible solutions/resolutions. Picture to yourself at this instance the burden of an educator or researcher assigned the task of clarifying national destiny in concert with other driven elements, other compelling forces, while performing his conventional duties, and the impact is there. Ignore for the moment the obviously grave implications of being ineluctably subject to the particular, to the finite political scales of reality, to the status of chasing-chasen, to make (in Heidegger's sense) and to being-made German sans cesse. Instead focus on two incomparably prodigious assumptions. One is that the educator (Heidegger himself, therefore) has prepared himself to penetrate to the essential nature of his discipline (philosophy in this instance) and to see there in its most arresting state, a prophesy, or a reflection, of the German state (or nature) in its most original form. Heidegger proposes a method (we should say, a grounded methodology) according to which that quest should be guided, a path towards the commencement, as he expresses it, of his people's spiritual-historic existence:

This commencement is the eruption of Greek philosophy. It is there that for the first time that Western man, by virtue of the genius of a people and the language of this people, encounters before him the BEING IN TOTALITY which he questions and apprehends as that being which he is. Every science is philosophy whether it knows or whether it wishes this to be so. Every science stands under the influence of this commencement
of philosophy. From this it draws the force of its essence on the condition that in general it remains at the height of that commencement. ... [What is relevant with respect to approaching Greek thought is not] assimilating PRAXIS to theory but, on the contrary, to understand theory as the highest form of authentic PRAXIS. For the Greeks science is not a cultural good but the very core of the most basic determinant of the framework of human existence within the State.... Our knowledge of things remains captive to the sweeping power of destiny and will fall before its forces.

Dual references, reflexion of the Same: Heidegger wants to make history, which is explicitly revolutionary, but as a purist who refuses to make choices between the theoretic and the practical vision and for whom science, inaugurating thought, belongs in its most penetrating being to philosophy and therefore to the Greeks. For a moment let us leap ahead to the extraordinary work on Nietzsche completed seven years later in 1940, in which a discussion of the Platonic notion of imitation and art leads Heidegger to consider ‘physis’, the essential structure of being, as it appears in The Republic: “... PHYSIS still means emergence for Plato, as it does primarily for the first beginnings of Greek philosophy, emergence in the way a rose emerges, unfolding itself ... PHYSIS is the primordial Greek grounding word for Being itself, in the sense of the presence that emerges of itself and so holds sway. Man cannot produce the IDEA: he can only be stationed before it.” Heidegger celebrates the violence of that exchange between human existence and its presence to the radiant disclosure of the secret and exalting movement of being itself. Transcendence in thought, far from being a spiritual exercise, calls into question human existence itself and it is the questioning itself which, as it constitutes the proper axis of philosophical discourse, must therefore embrace the scientific discourse. Heidegger will reach towards the present moment of his audience and his constituency only in name. There is a strangely scriptural vehemence to his invocation of the Greek tradition, as much to say that through its ground, the present is secured: authenticity secured, at least in the moment of freedom of apprehension. But the true aim of the violence is manifest, in my reading, when Heidegger compels his constituency to identify national destiny, national politics, and race itself in the nation state, through HIS vision of the exalted, that is, within the system of references produces out of the Greek text (however the body of this tradition is approached or made use of, one faces in the end a
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series of texts). Destiny receives its own, its proper, forging in the fires of exclusion. Exclude those persons to whom the tradition is alien. In the ultimate exclusion, refuse the exclusivity of the total project, obliterate the differences that constitute philosophical discourse: do not recognize the ground of the exceptional, the other. Destiny in these terms is preempted rather than promised, thrust upon rather than shared. Savor the enthusiasm in whose light temporal orders become indistinct, in whose light the commencement reads as irrepressibility. Heidegger's enthusiasm overwhelms his once modest presumption of an address to be "signed and delivered".

The commencement has fallen into our future, which is where it resides until we are enjoined to rise to its greatness. Only by strict adherence to the greatness of the commencement can science become the necessity of our existence SPIRITUAL world of a people is not the superstructure of a race and certainly not an arsenal of usable knowledge and values but its greatest powers of conservation of earth and of blood: in terms of the force of the most intimate emotion of its existence and in terms of the highest power it possesses capable of shaking itself to the very roots. A spiritual world alone is what secures a people's greatness. For by bringing into play the constant tension between the will to greatness on the one the one side and, on the other, the laissez-faire of decadence, it gives its rhythm to the step taken by our people towards its historical future.

Implicit in Heidegger's strategy are the distinctions presupposed between classes of scientific research, between modes of transcendental consciousness or apprehension, and between various political/propaedeutic fields of application (meaning university and state operations, what belongs and does not belong to them by right), but these can be discussed later. What fascinates us is the primacy of this other order of business, the sacred agenda. We refer to his obsession with future-pasts, his annihilating nostalgias, and the experimental theater into which the university would ultimately be transformed, or, in light of the title of the address, asserted towards, that is, affirmed and transfigured. Heidegger reveals elevated heights, but as we remarked just above, weighted with refusal, haunted by the immanence of failure, this is affirmation with a difference. He takes up the instruments of administration, the instruments of concrete realities, German or otherwise:

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The German student body's resolve to experience the destiny of the German people in its moment of greatest distress is one source of will with respect to the essence of the university. This will is genuine inasmuch as the German student body, thanks to new student rights, comes under the law of its own essence and, at the same time, defines this essence from the first. To accord the law to oneself is the highest freedom. Owing to its completely negative nature and therefore its inauthenticity, the oft-vaunted "academic freedom" of the German university is being driven out. It was really a carefree situation inimical to genuine projects and intentions—laxness in whatever one carried or failed to carry out. The concept of freedom of the German student is now redirected to its truth. From this source emanate the German student's future obligations and service.

Heidegger therefore does not shrink, at least not here, from hand to hand combat, (HAND figures prominently in the Heideggerian readings of the world an image that presumes the terms of the praxis/theory antinomy to which we have referred: I say 'presume' rather than 'bridge' because, while the latter suggests reciprocal and passive function, 'presume' is invested with the force of an agent, of conviction that stands prior). The "German" student's authenticity is in his words an accusation of the present. Not the simple temporal present of the university and its daily realities but the deepening present (presence) of FORCE that spills over into the violence of the future and threatens (Heidegger raising high the threat) to wreck what had hitherto reigned as "law" within the institution, wreckage that—and this is fundamental—would be the trace element of a drive into truth, which conduct can only mean delivering spiritual and intellectual energy to the cause of national destiny, a euphemism in this context for national socialism. Professors have two choices. One is allegiance and conscientious support. The other is dissociation.

Heidegger envisions three areas of responsibility that will define the present/future generation of students. The first is archetypal: work service within the "popular" community, sharing the burden of the laboring classes and thus gripping by hand the hand that moves the earth. Heidegger alludes then to their spiritual mission, the third area, the one that cuts closest to the heart of the matter, the track that leads from obscurity to light, from ignorance to the path cleared for the German people by the student and by the professional
elite of society whose powers encompass the "matricial" forms of human being itself. Indeed knowledge, he affirms', is not at the service of the professions but the reverse.

But this knowledge is not for us the undisturbed consciousness of essentialities and values-in-themselves; it is the blade that cuts to the very quick of the awesome power of a being's existence.

He continues to expand that theme to include, as one must now assume, the state as structural fulfillment of spiritual restlessness. Once the ultimate arbiter in human affairs has been enlightened, made worthy of the authority of state, what separates students from the higher orders of military and intellectual service must be, what else, but the nazi hierarchy itself. We would not be exaggerating in saying that the professional elite exercises a precarious status. For Heidegger rather sublimates student roles. He would have devolve upon them the victor's privilege of announcing the terms of engagement and occupation. In a word, the revolutionary vanguard is where the rector would, obviously, wish it to be, between the combat corps under the Führer's rule and the undefined university administration and teaching elites. Heidegger will analyse the factors that alienate the professional corps of the university. His examination must inevitably (following the lines of argument) track the nature, for example, of faculty incompetence in science as primordial condition for the liberation of certain peoples. Moreover, seizing the nature of the axis of control and ideology is integral to this enterprise: Heidegger, that is, must and will politicize the unrealized objectives of the scientific inquiry by appropriating them to the student. We could say "virtual" student but that would imply a contemplative, cautiously reasoned argument, which is hardly the case here, as the student is invested with all the intentional significance of the militant, the agent, the revolutionary who functions within the state framework. That framework embodies the second of the areas of student responsibility.

Heidegger finishes his address in rousing style. Answering the new regime's call for university reform in the image of the Führer's likeness, he reprises the principle arguments in a form of assault on the complacency of the non-constituent, the equivalent of an enemy force, the non-combattant. Reference to the "new science" is all but unavoidable: without it the rector becomes another Great Pretender. It founds the project and very lifeblood of the intellec-
tual institution. It redeployes the positions presented to readers six years previously in *Sein un Zeit* when Heidegger pronounced upon man's fall in the modern age from the truth or light of being. Above all it promises refuge, a helping hand, to the fledgling regime of terror and destruction. This is less accommodation of interests than it is the celebration of a pact formulated in history (Heidegger's version), which, decreed for the present/future, calls for the renewal of an "original" humanism.

The will of the essence of the teaching corps must be roused to assert itself in the interest of the simplicity and encompassing dimensions of knowledge as it concerns science. The will of the essence of our students must endeavor to reach the highest levels of clarity and intellectual rigor; further, it must make known, through its relationship to the people and their state, the form of the essence of science by endowing the latter with exigence and determination. Both of these wills must also assert themselves mutually in combat. The total capacity of will and thought, all the strength of the heart and of the body must be engaged THROUGH combat, be affirmed and maintained AS combat. We have chosen the responsible combat of those who question and who, with Karl von Clausewitz, say: "I declare myself free of futile hope by embracing the refuge offered to me by destiny."

To close this first account of Heidegger's descent into political waters, a few observations drawn from another context will help to put what must appear as abstract or oblique into more immediate perspective. Although Heidegger attempted to distance himself in (1945 in the text *Das Rektorat 1933–1934. Tatsachen und Gedanken*) from the impact of what was pronounced the 27th of May, the address did not go unnoticed. The impact was considerable, within and without the academic world. The Nazi university student journal hailed the address as the one single rectoral address deserving of dissemination and support. What mattered most were its revolutionary vision and programmatic concerns. Heidegger in fact defeated his competition in this respect, in this sordid exhibition. The nonofficial press as always reprocessed officially sanctioned and promulgated material. Heidegger was in danger of becoming, if not a household name, then an instant classic in the Nazi vernacular. Typical of the reception and also the tenor of press response would be the comment that
appeared in *The Rheinische-Westtaliaische Zeitung*, which wrote that he had, "...for the first time succeeded in showing the relations between the university and the total state to those who together would form the future of the German university in the German State." One of the most important of the nation's elite bourgeois dailies, *Berliner Borsenzeitung*, remarked that few such addresses had "...created such a fascinating effect while still challenging its audience." Moreover the residual impact of the address was also telling: even through to the summer of 1936, that is, subsequent to Heidegger's disaffection (the famous "break") with official national socialist leadership, the address retained it status as a reference point for university reform. Further, its martial fervor did not of course escape the observer For contrary to what Heidegger would claim in the 1966 interview published posthumously (May, 1976) in *Der Spiegel*, the thematic division of the address (knowledge/work/state military) did in reality serve to create the impression that he had proposed in favor of this concrete insertion of the military component into the province of the university. We have seen that for ourselves. Early into the interview the question put to him was whether he had not thought to establish the priority of the service of knowledge particularly in light of the Nazi insistence on the greater importance of the other two "pillars" of responsibility. The response is instructive.

It's not a matter of "pillars". If you read me carefully you would have understood that although the service of knowledge does occupy the third place, the meaning assigned puts it above the others. What should be taken into consideration is that work and defense are based, as every human activity is, on a certain body of knowledge from which it draws light.

Among the more curious betrayals committed by Heidegger were the considerable favors accorded by the rectorate to Nazi militant students. Living accommodations were arranged in castles, and ultra-conservative fraternities based on the ritualistic orders of the Crusades were encouraged. Heidegger's deeply romantic nostalgia ascended into this vision of the ascetic warrior pursuing truth on horseback, in monastic cells, and through painted landscapes. His tenure as rector ended after only ten months. Shortly thereafter, in 1934, the year before Hitler's race laws deprived German Jews of their citizenship, now with the prospect of becoming the director of a Prussian teacher's college,
Heidegger proposed specific educational objectives and measures which again reflected his obsession with the life dedicated to higher causes, the life of revolutionizing austerity and vision: total commitment to service. The questions that permeate the career (word of vulgar associations): in whose name, in whose cause, in whose persecution, would the Heideggerian experiment in heraldic fascism commit that service?

* * *

Heidegger would not retract for the remainder of his life what had been clearly staked out as his ground and as theirs, the new regime's. Statements were made to the effect that he recognized his “stupidity”, that the excesses so committed were not repeated. But Heidegger had become in the years following Hitler's defeat a luminous figure obsessed with the defense of the German language as the mistress of the Greek and for that reason a phantom structure for which he, the philosopher, would seek definition: definition in the sense of contour and elementary articulation created at the interior of Being. Yet Being surrenders itself as absence and as the forgotten. Futility, that is, anguishes the seeking and the formulation of evidence or appropriation. Discerning within German the steps that contravene loss, contravene the necessity of the “phantom structure” would bring Heidegger closer to the failures of completion of *Sein und Zeit*. An expensive fragmentation took place: a working with remoteness itself. The fascination in Heidegger, what makes the Heidegger case compelling study, were the political consequences of committing oneself to an ideology from outside, from a philosophy that could tolerate distancing itself from rationalized political behavior. This raw piece of political behavior. Heidegger's refusal to "deconstruct" the original avowal of "nascent" nazism could now only confirm the motives which were responsible for the Address of May, 1933. His continued identification of the United States and the USSR as the forerunners in civilization's trajectory into total and final vacuity we should understand as perspicacity itself: Heidegger the exterior man looks in. Heidegger permits the inscription of time present and time on the quickened path.

With the brilliant analyses of Luc Ferry and Alain Renaut, the occultation by the French intelligentsia (the philosopher's chief line of support) of the unflattering yet fundamental elements in Heidegger were, to borrow a phrase, put through a shredder. Caught in a landscape controlled by Marxism, Critical
Theory, and structuralism French intellectuals who wanted to revive the philosophical project outside of that containment discovered in Heidegger sources of material and critical ground both historical and, for them, unconfined, capable, that is, capable of embracing critical theory and privileging what has since been sold under the term of de-construction. The object of cult, of speculation and deification, Heidegger reestablished a different brinkhead: exegesis of particular poets and hermeneutic analysis, which refuge into wilful and protracted denial did not, of course, impede the gratuitous slide into the region of cult furies. Heidegger's anti-democratic and anti-modernist pronouncements made enemies but also confirmed consolidated support bases. His appeal to the academic industries had been guaranteed within three years of the publication of *Sein und Zeit* but in the 1950s and 1960s Heidegger's presence in European thought was nothing less than monolithic. That meant that within German thought ultimately resided the possibilities of the freedom of thought and the liberty of action. A manifest absurdity but worn with resolution The outcry that greeted the 1987 publication in Paris of the book by Victor Farias, *Heidegger et le nazisme*, revealed to what degree myths die hard. Heideggerians had always known of the master's nazi committment but the Farias book delivered page after crushing page of incriminating evidence, much of which was new, and however tenuous the procedural methods used may have been, the massiveness of the indictment produced symptoms of vertigo in more than one circle. The Ferry/Renaut study study proceeds on the assumption that the need for the construction of an alternative humanism has never been more urgent, has never been, as the Heidegger controversy developed into a political polemic, as clearly put before us.

Following from here the Ferry/Renaut critique of Heidegger's metaphysics of subjectivity (*Introduction to Metaphysics, Letter On Humanism*), in which the philosopher's preoccupation with the truth of being forces him to sacrifice another set of truths, those which define the values a man creates of himself and therefore his potential to clear a space in which to build a lawful state, however much divided by conflict and ambivalences (for example, rewarding behavior which violates constitutional law because it conforms to a certain and sanctioned tradition or custom): the perfectibility of the person, this illusion that most violates what Heidegger holds as impregnable and truth-worthy in the search to which man in his finite existence (*Da-sein*) is "geared to" or thrown-towards, performs a kind of complex maneuver which will permit a
person to act at liberty. That Heidegger's foundational concept, developed in *Sein und Zeit*, of the forgetfulness of being becoming the instrument of an arbitrary forgetfulness (belonging to man but not as a necessary attribute) which confers to the form its own formless expanse, preempts a philosophy of political right. Further, if Heidegger wishes to refute classic ethnocentrism in the name of the authentic, he would then deprive the subject of that free-from materiality, his faculty of imagination, upon which rational political control would be based.

Heidegger's own adventure with notions of the supranational destiny of the German nation camouflages this well-spring of contradiction: indeed his anguished preoccupation and fear of the rootless, deracinated and wayward "species" produced on this planet by history results in a peculiar apology idolatry. The Kantian view of the transcendent man who emerges unburdened by racial and biological determinations returns us to Rousseau and to "le néant" from which that trajectory towards a determination-free status in the first instance emanates. It is in this sense that Habermas interprets Heidegger's deviation under the impress of national socialism as precisely that, a deviation, but already implicit in the ontological status assigned, in *Sein und Zeit*, to man's pre-scientific (or pretechnical) spirit. The course of historical consciousness would necessarily have to manifest itself in inauthenticity and subjective aberration (megalomania). Only a German *Da-sein* would be capable of grappling with the 'fallenness' which would then strike at and define the human condition, imperil and disfigure its capacity for recognizing truth.

In the preceding pages I have confined my attention to a particular historical context with which Heidegger's ideological and philosophical positions reached a common point or a source held in common. That context prefigured what would become the great drama of the century, in Asia as well as in Europe. Ironically or not, the time present appears in all its instability and precariousness to have moved beyond what one would normally term the ideological. Our fascination with the violence and the conflicts which have marked indeed empowered the evolution of the institutions and the network of reality that constitute our stream of time may be the one response available to us for making sense of that absence. The intensity of emotion aroused by the Heidegger polemic in Europe should be understood, at least in part, in this larger, inclusive context. The pathos of Heidegger's protracted embrace of fascism offers in itself a path to retreat. After all, it would not require much
The imagination to produce an apology based on the complexity of the man's experiment in national socialism, his aborted attempt to carry through on anything approaching a successful political program, or one could revive the figure of the demented and visionary romantic ill-equipped to trade exchanges in the violent sphere of political action. For my own part, I would urge rather that we examine the matter of the political initiative seen in the light of ethical and socio-economic motives. That is, examine the violence endemic to the society towards which we are directed in terms of the broader issues one confronts in reading history, in reading Heidegger within it. One can only concur with Ricoeur's impassioned call for a demarcation of the ethical with relation to the specificity of the political and the economic spheres. In renewing Hegelian distinctions between the autonomy of the economic motors of a society (therefore an abstract entity) and the deep-rooted sources of the historical community's character (profoundly concrete, therefore narrative) he defines alternative strategies for making sense of the senseless and for convincing us that the insertion of the ethical pursuit alongside (as intersection) polity and economy constitutes the necessary condition for the creation of the democratic state in which conflict and power are regulated by the freedom to create consensus and thus a plurality of voices.

Eric Weil's judgement that the individual in modern society is unsatisfied is not one that will provoke heated controversy. It does offer terrain for bringing together two of the themes that I wish to touch upon in conclusion. I believe that the contradictions brought to light in our examination of Heidegger will thus be clarified in a context to which our present and future are bound.

One is exclusion. The most telling events of the current decade have been in my view the accident at the nuclear plant site in the USSR and the production of the "Stealth" bomber in the United States. In the former case we witnessed an extraordinary crime committed against the people for whom the project was designed to help. Moreover the effects of that disaster, as we now know, were not at all limited to national boundaries. Later investigation revealed a history of earlier malfunctions caused in part by defective designs of the original plant. But the critical factor was the continued violation of basic operational procedure and the policy of ignoring violations. Criminal responsibility cannot be placed conveniently upon those in administrative positions. From the higher reaches of centralized bureaucracy to the men and women employed
in the manual operation of reactor the potential for calamity of the greatest magnitude was not only known and therefore ignored, but visibly and palpably observed and condoned long before the final breakdown. Warnings went unheeded, apparently because of the fear of reprisals of all sorts, not least being those directed at employment security.

The Stealth aircraft was built at staggering costs to the American economy. The matter of whether the veil of secrecy was intended in the first instance to protect contractors from the scrutiny of the impartial observer rings with all the signs of pathological fear: whether the complicity of elected government representatives and the legions of the managerial/entrepreneurial agents and technical personnel required to carry out monumental research and manufacturing projects in universal silence not only violates the letter and spirit of a lawful society but has resulted in one more permanent series of toxin generating corpses. Not surprisingly, news of the technical failures of the aircraft design became a project in disinformation, assuming a certain equivalence with the product itself. In any event, the democratic electorate has emerged as damaged as the strategic posture of the United States. A product designed to intensify conflict in the world's confrontational theaters (therefore promoting the initiative of "first strike" nuclear strategists), the lethalized impact of the Stealth (one appreciates the symbolic reversal denoted by the name) aircraft affects the very core of democratic institutions, that is, their legitimacy and their survival as we approach the 21st Century. Where the Stealth and Chernobyl issues interpenetrate are at the points that frame the efforts of the persons responsible for their operation and production: efforts which by concerted policies of deceit excluded the RIGHTS of citizens to know what manner of service was to be offered to them in the name of efficiency and security.

I have sought to personalize the discussion of what was intended by exclusionary powers. This should not however deflect from the "formal" considerations which Weil's judgement brings to bear on the nature of social and political constraint. If we examine the other side of the exclusionary process, we come up against the irrationality and imprudence of the workplace itself in the technological market structure of our economics. Markets which define human relations in ways that we cannot make intelligible to ourselves. What Marx and Hegel attributed to the process of modern labor in all of its forms as RATIONAL motivation and justification have never appeared less pertinent or more distortional. Work, being imposed from without and removed in its effects
from those held responsible for it, ceases to be rational endeavor and prevails over the forces of common sense and common sympathies which form the basis of what Weil termed the decision-making capacities of the organic historic community, itself the foundation and *raison d'être* of the modern state. As Ricoeur has observed, the flight of the individual in Western and Eastern societies from the public sphere to the atrophied spaces of private concern reads as the great indictment of that market-oriented direction into which we have been drawn neither for nor against the forces of will recognized as proper to us as individuals.