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From Russia with All Due Respect: Revisiting the Rezanov Embassy to Japan

William McOmie

本稿は、近年ようやく公刊されたロシア全権大使ニコライ・レザノフの滞在日記を読み解きながら、ロシア最初の遣日使節団（1804–1805）の歴史的意義を再評価する。レザノフの滞在日記は、自らが率いた使節団が失敗した理由に新たな光を当てただけでなく、レザノフが幾つかの副次的な目的を果たし、後の使節団の成功の礎を築いたことを示す点で、大きな歴史的価値を有する。本稿は、レザノフの滞在日記を他の海外資料と比較することで、使節団に関する理解の空白を埋めることを目的とする。また、使節団が、日本と西洋双方の文化・政治・経済的潮流を加速させ、半世紀後に日本が開国をする一因となったと論じる。

本稿は、英語訳で発表されたレザノフ使節団の当初の記述が、いかに日本と長崎駐在のオランダ商人の否定的なイメージを助長し、広めることになったかを描写する初の論文である。その結果、アングロ・アメリカ世界では日本が開港が必要であるとの認識が高まり、ヨーロッパでは、長期間出島で軟禁状態におかれ、旧弊な服従儀礼を強いられるオランダ人が哄笑と憐憫の対象となったのである。

本稿は、西洋の歴史家のレザノフ使節団に対する様々な見解を比べ、通常の西洋的アプローチと日本人研究者のアプローチを対比させる。また、本稿は、日本人漂流民の送還や江戸幕府役人との友好関係の構築など、交易と外交以外の側面的重要性を強調する。
In 2004 I visited an exhibit at the National Archives in Tokyo dedicated to the 150th anniversary of the opening of Japanese ports in 1854. I expected that the exhibit would begin with the American and Russian naval expeditions to Japan led, respectively, by Commodore Perry and Admiral Putiatin in 1853. However, to my surprise, it began with the much earlier, and lesser-known Russian embassy to Japan of 1804-05 headed by Chamberlain Nikolai Petrovich Rezanov. This was the first official Russian embassy to Japan, and as is well-known, its members were kept waiting in Nagasaki for several months before being completely rebuffed in their commercial and diplomatic aims by the shogunate in Edo. If it had so failed in its main purposes, I wondered why the organizers of the exhibit considered it important enough to be included in it. Moreover, why was approximately equal space devoted to it as to that of the Perry expedition?

In this article I will reconsider and reevaluate the historical significance of this embassy in the light of recent scholarship and
one newly-available original account, in order to determine if the archival view of it is justified. It is hoped that the recently published diary of ambassador Rezanov, together with a close reading of the other major foreign original sources dealing with this mission, as well as a few original Japanese sources will shed a critical light upon the deeper cultural, political and economic currents flowing beneath the surface, which too narrow a focus on its superficial diplomatic failure may cause one to overlook. It was these very currents that brought the embassy to Japan.

The personal journal of ambassador Rezanov is of considerable historical value, not only for the light it sheds on the reasons for the failure of the embassy, but also in how it illumines the ways in which it may be justifiably be said to have succeeded, or at least, to have laid the basis for the success of later embassies. Nevertheless, those sections of it which concern the lengthy stay of the Russian embassy in Nagasaki were subjected first to Tsarist and then to Soviet censorship, and not published in Russia until comparatively recently (1995). A Japanese translation appeared shortly thereafter (2000), but no translation has yet been published in English. Accordingly, I have translated extensive extracts from the Russian original for this article.

The other major foreign accounts of this embassy, written by two of its participants, Lt. Commander Ivan Fyodorovich (Adam Johan) Krusenstern and the German natural scientist and physician Georg H. Von Langsdorff were both translated into English and published in London in 1813 and 1817, respectively.
Both were widely read and exerted a major influence on the
image of Japan by the English-speaking world over the next few
decades until the American and Russian naval expeditions of 1853
and 1854. These accounts, and that of Krusenstern in particular,
would be instrumental in forging a more impatient and even
indignant ethnocentric approach to the question of opening Japan
to Western commerce and diplomacy. Langsdorff’s narrative was
written more from the viewpoint of what we would recognize
today as ‘cultural relativity’ than that of Krusenstern. The latter’s
account was clearly a forerunner of the militant, uncompromising
and intolerant approach adopted by Commodore Perry some five
decades later. The fourth major foreign account of this embassy is
that of Hendrik Döeff, the resident superintendent of the Dutch
‘factory’ on the island of Dejima in Nagasaki during the entire
stay of the Russian embassy there. Although those of a fellow
European, his recollections offer a different perspective on, and
serve as a sharp contrast in some key aspects to the better-known
accounts of Langsdorff and Krusenstern.

A Brief Review of Previous Scholarship

One might say that this first official Russian embassy to Japan
has a long history of being described inaccurately or interpreted
with prejudice, based on biased sources and unfounded rumors.
This tendency began with Krusenstern himself, whose personal
animosity and lack of respect toward Rezanov, and
misunderstanding of Japanese customs and political conditions,
has unfortunately influenced many later writers.

Vasily Golovnin, who suffered a two-year captivity in Japan, as a direct result of the attacks on Japanese settlements on Sahalin and the Kurils, which Rezanov had ordered two officers of the Russian-American company to carry out, also did not have a high opinion of Rezanov’s character. He thought that he had had no cause to complain about the treatment that he had received at the hands of the Japanese, except for their refusal to allow him freedom of movement and to engage in trade.

The German physician P. F. Von Siebold, resident on Dejima from 1823–29, thought that the failure of the Rezanov embassy was owing to his unfamiliarity with Japanese customs, etiquette and language. However, Siebold must not have read Rezanov’s diary, for if he had, it is difficult to imagine that he could have made such claims.\(^4\)

In the introduction to the official Narrative of an American Squadron to the China Seas and Japan..., the official account of the American naval expedition led by Commodore M. C. Perry, and published after his return to the United States in 1856, Francis Hawks provided a rather garbled, capsule account of the Rezanov embassy. He did not mention which original account of the mission his own is based on, but it seems to derive largely from that of Krusenstern, and is unfairly critical of the conduct of the envoy Rezanov. For example, he claimed that “[Rezanov] had hardly arrived, however, before he furnished abundant evidence of his unfitness for the delicate mission with which he was
He commenced his intercourse with the Japanese officials by a dispute on a ridiculous point of etiquette, viz: whether he should make a bow to the Emperor's representatives. Next, he positively refused to surrender the arms of the ship, according to the usual custom, though it was perfectly useless to retain them, as he had given up all the ammunition to the Japanese. He then very foolishly contrived to convince the inmates of the Dutch factory at Dezima, to whom he brought letters, that he suspected them of secretly intrigue to defeat his purposes with the Japanese; while, in point of fact, the sagacious Dutchman, Doeff, who had charge of Dezima, was exercising all his ingenuity to pursue such a nicely balanced system of non-committal..., and to turn events to the advantage of himself and his countrymen.”

As I hope to show later in this article, whether Rezanov was, in fact, unsuited for his ‘delicate mission’ begs the question of whether any official envoy of the Russian empire could have been. Krusenstern was highly critical of Rezanov’s conduct of the mission, but it is very unlikely that he would have made a more suitable envoy. Moreover, it is extremely ingenuous for Hawks to fault Rezanov for insisting on ‘a ridiculous point of etiquette’ when Commodore Perry made a determined insistence on similar points of etiquette a cornerstone of his policy toward the Japanese, and even ascribed his success thereto. As for the alleged intrigues of Doeff against the Russian embassy, he seems to be merely dressing the unclad and unsubstantiated rumors of the
day in the guise of historical fact.

The Russian historian Voensky (1895), writing some forty years after Perry and Putiatin had first set an example, suggested that if Rezanov had come at the head of a strong naval squadron, he might have succeeded in opening Japanese ports fifty years earlier.6)

Turning to the Japanese viewpoint, a high appraisal of the historical significance of the Rezanov embassy may be found in the English version of a history of the fifty years since the opening of Japanese ports, Fifty Years of New Japan (1910) compiled by Count Okuma Shigenobu. At the beginning of one of the chapters of this book, Okuma pondered the historical significance of the Rezanov embassy:

“It is now nearly a hundred years since a Russian envoy set foot in this country, and with his arrival put an end to its long repose, tranquility and seclusion. Half a century later, the arrival of Commodore Perry with his fleet of ‘black ships’ aggravated the situation until it culminated in the Shogun’s resignation, and withdrawal from a rule of the country which had lasted for two hundred and fifty years.”7)

In this quotation Okuma clearly seems to be implying that Perry was more indebted than he would care to admit to a failed Russian embassy that came five decades previously for his own success in concluding a treaty opening two Japanese ports to American ships. To say that Perry and his black ships merely ‘aggravated’ a pre-existing political situation in Japan, would
seem to argue against the consistent claim by the Commodore and Hawks, and the great majority of subsequent American scholars of his expedition that all of the credit for opening Japanese ports belongs to the Americans alone.\(^8\)

That Okuma meant to underscore the importance of the Rezanov mission to Perry’s later success is further supported by comments he allegedly made at a speech given in July 1916 on the occasion of the conclusion of a pact between Russia and Japan. These comments were alluded to by Ramming (1926) in the following manner:

“The late Marquis Okuma declared in 1916, in one of his speeches, during the World War, that the fame for having opened Japan’s doors should belong to the Russian envoy Rezanov, not Commodore Perry. This at first glance somewhat puzzling assertion provoked bitter protests in the American press, by those who had taken it in an unnecessarily literal sense; for Okuma wanted first of all to say something pleasant on the occasion of the Russo-Japanese pact, which had just then gone into effect.”\(^9\)

Nevertheless, given Okuma’s assertion, as quoted above from a book published before the war (1910), it would seem likely that such comments also stemmed from his own personal conviction, and not merely out of a politician’s desire to please the Russian public.

In his book *Japan’s Northern Frontier* (1953) John A. Harrison remarked that the attacks on the northern borders of Japan by Russians in 1806–7 which followed as a direct result of the
rejection of the Rezanov embassy, seemed to have been regarded as a declaration of war. “Such apprehension was aroused that Count Okuma Shigenobu has written that the events of 1807 convinced the public-spirited men (shishi) of that day of the necessity of opening the country to foreign trade.” Moreover, he disagreed with Ramming as to the significance of the wartime speech by Okuma. In a footnote, he added that “In a speech in 1916 Count Okuma, then premier of Japan, gave credit to Rezanov for opening Japan, saying that it had been the Russians and not Perry who opened the ports... This is an extremely significant statement from one of the great statesmen of the Restoration.”

In The Russian Push Toward Japan (1959), still a basic reference book for scholars of Russo-Japanese history, the American historian G. A. Lensen provided the first detailed narrative and analysis of Rezanov’s mission in English, which was based primarily on the original accounts of Krusenstern and Langsdorff, as well as secondary sources in Russian and Japanese. Although he did not have access to that portion of Rezanov’s diary that concerned his stay in Nagasaki, he drew upon an article about his mission by Voensky (1895) that referred to it. Lensen correctly concluded that Rezanov’s embassy was not the complete failure that it appeared to be at the time, nor as it was thought to be by many in subsequent decades. He also noted Okuma’s opinion about its legacy.

“Actually Rezanov had not failed as miserably as he himself had assumed. Humiliated though he felt, he had been asked to do no
more than to conform to the etiquette of the country and, in fact, had not been forced to do so. From the Japanese point of view, he had been permitted to abide by European customs. At their rudest, the Japanese officials had treated him with greater respect than some of his own mutinous subordinates. His diplomatic efforts had made a more favorable impression on the Japanese than on his own countrymen, so much so that Marquis Okuma Shigenobu, one time Prime Minister of Japan, expressed the view in later years that it was Rezanov who first really demonstrated to the Japanese the need of opening the country."

The British historian James Murdoch also recognized the importance of the Rezanov embassy. In his *A History of Japan* (1926) he points out that “The first accredited envoy from any European Court to Japan, since the repulse of the mission from Lisbon in 1647, appeared at Nagasaki in 1804, on board the first European man-of-war that ever cast anchor in a Japanese harbour.” This fact has been largely overlooked by subsequent historians, and by itself it seems to indicate that a new era of intercourse with the West was about to begin.

However, some more recent British historians have paid little attention to the Rezanov embassy and even interpreted it in a contradictory manner, such as Beasley (1955) who wrote that “The second of these missions, that of Rezanov in 1804, was treated with scant courtesy.” In contrast, Sansom (1963) attested that “The ambassador, Vasilii Rezanov, [sic] was treated politely enough, but he met nothing but delay and obstruction for several
months. In March 1805 he was told that instructions had come from Yedo, and he must leave forthwith. This he did.” This apparent contradiction in the characterization of its treatment may be resolved if we suppose that what Beasley meant to say was that meeting with “nothing but delay and obstruction for several months” was, in European eyes, not very courteous. As we shall see later, there were even some Japanese contemporaries of Rezanov who felt the same way.\(^{13}\)

On the other hand, Japanese historians have tended to pay much more attention to the Rezanov embassy, and its repatriation of four Japanese drifters, despite its diplomatic failure. They generally give equal emphasis to the other important dimensions besides trade and diplomacy, such as in the broad areas of language and culture, the development of friendly relations, and the evolution of ideas about the proper stance of Japan toward the outside world.

In his article “From sakoku to kaikoku : 1853–1858” Conrad Totman (1980) alluded to the historical antecedents to Perry, but did not state specifically what they were. This author believes that one of the most important of the historical precedents to the opening of Japanese ports in those years was the Rezanov embassy to Nagasaki.

In his later work on Japanese history (1993) Totman gives a brief account of the Rezanov embassy and the possible reasons for its rejection by the shogunate. He suggests that the most probable cause was the opposition of the imperial court in Kyoto,
which also helps to explain the long delay in sending a reply to Nagasaki. This accords with the explanation given to Rezanov by the Nagasaki interpreters of Dutch.\textsuperscript{14)

The Japanese historian Miyachi Masato (1987) stresses the importance of the repatriation of the Japanese castaways with both the Laxman and Rezanov missions.\textsuperscript{15) Kisaki Ryohei (1997) also attaches great importance to the return of the Japanese drifters, even including them in the titles of his two companion volumes concerning the Laxman and Rezanov expeditions, and the Japanese drifters who were repatriated with them.\textsuperscript{16)}

Ohshima Mikio (2000) stresses its historical interest in the introduction to his Japanese translation of Rezanov’s Diary. “Rezanov’s diary of his stay in Japan, forbidden by censorship to be published in Russia for many years, contains many facts of profound interest.” When read in concert with Japanese sources he thought that it should clarify the actual conditions in which his embassy to Nagasaki took place as one page in the history of Russian and Japanese intercourse.\textsuperscript{17)

The Historical Background to the Rezanov Embassy

At the beginning of European intercourse with Japan, the Jesuit missionary Francis Xavier in a letter to his superiors in Europe pleaded that only the best and most energetic Catholic missionaries be sent to Japan. Approximately one hundred years later, after virtually all traces of Christianity in Japan had been erased, the most desirable sort of person for a sojourn in Japan
was now transformed into its opposite. In 1650 the board of
directors of the Dutch United East India Company (VOC) stated
in a document that it was important. “to closely observe the
desires of this impudent, haughty and demanding nation and to
oblige them in every way.” It was further stressed that only.
“modest, humble, polite and free and friendly people.” were to be
sent to Dejima. Since then the best agents of the VOC in Japan
were considered to be the most obedient and submissive, the
humblest and most courteous. Although the VOC was formally
disbanded in 1799, the Dutch traders confined to the artificial
island of Dejima were still expected to display when custom
demanded the outward signs of obeisance to the agents of
shogunal authority in Nagasaki in order not to endanger the
long-standing commercial relationship between Holland and
Japan. For a century and a half prior to the arrival of the Russian
embassy in Nagasaki in October 1804, there would have been very
few (if any) European witnesses to the external forms of this
submissive relationship other than the employees of the VOC and
its successor company itself.

Yet not even all of the earliest European visitors to Japan in the
late 16th and early 17th centuries were willing to obey Japanese
customs; some, especially the military officers among the Iberians,
considered such submissive rituals to be beneath their dignity,
and insisted on showing courtesy in their own way, in accord
with European norms. This was probably a contributing factor in
the expulsion of the Spanish and Portuguese from Japan.
In contrast to the prescribed meekness and obedience of the Dutch merchants on Dejima, the determination by later European envoys to Japan to adhere to their own diplomatic customs, and rules of etiquette, even while in Japan, began in earnest with the Russian envoy Adam Laxman in 1792–93.

Laxman’s visit to the northern island of Ezo (Hokkaido) and his request to establish trade eventually prompted the head of the shogunal senior council (roju shuseki) Matsudaira Sadanobu to bestow the sanction of centuries-old ‘ancestral law’ on an actually newly-created policy that excluded all foreign countries, including neighboring Russia, from diplomatic communication (tsushin) or from trade (tsusho), except those nations with which it already conducted such relations. Nevertheless, Sadanobu softened his refusal by issuing a permit for one Russian ship to enter Nagasaki harbor to pursue further negotiations concerning trade. In this way, Laxman’s visit was the stimulus that set the shogunate on track toward an increasingly militant exclusionist policy that was justified by a subtle rewriting of history.

In his book about the arrival of the Perry expedition (2003), Mitani Hiroshi states that it was the expedition led by Rezanov which prompted the shogunate to declare explicitly the implicit principle enunciated by Sadanobu in his reply to Laxman in 1793. This declaration then became the fundamental law of the land in regard to foreign relations, and was maintained with determination for the next half century.

“The ‘admonition’ given to him by the government put the
principles expressed to Laxman in even more concrete terms, specifying four countries--China, Korea, Ryukyu, and Holland--with whom Japan had relations of intercourse and commerce,... At the beginning of the Tokugawa period, specific countries had been forbidden to call at Japanese ports; here, conversely, the countries permitted access to Japan were listed.”

In 1801 the Nagasaki interpreter of Dutch Shizuki Tadao, in answer to arguments being advanced in favor of permitting trade with Russia in the north of Japan, published his *Sakokuron*, which was not an original work, but a translation of Kaempfer’s famous late 17th century essay about the advantages of the Tokugawa decision to expel the Spanish and Portuguese and establish a lasting peace in the country. By providing a name for the shogunate’s new exclusionist foreign policy, it served to further bolster the justification for it. Ironically, this title was based on an inaccurate Dutch translation of the original German.

Since the late 18th century especially, the Western world had been rapidly moving in the direction of expanding commerce, the exploration of the remotest areas of the earth and the gathering of scientific knowledge about all the countries, peoples, animal and plant species living on it. In the meantime, the Edo shogunate was responding to the annoyances and threats posed by the increasing number of Western ships encroaching upon Japan by adopting an ever stricter isolationism. Sooner or later, these two opposed tendencies were bound to collide against each other, and to continue doing so, until one or the other changed course. The
first serious challenge to the new ‘sakoku’ policy would come in 1804 in the form of the Rezanov embassy.

**A Brief Overview of the Aims of the Rezanov Embassy**

A detailed chronological narrative of all the events and negotiations between Rezanov and the Japanese officials in Nagasaki that incorporates all original foreign and Japanese sources would likely provide further insight into the historical significance of this embassy. However, such a narrative clearly lies beyond the scope of this article. Instead I will present only a summary of some of the main events, and concentrate on lesser known aspects of the embassy, in particular those that are amply represented in Rezanov’s diary. Such an approach will I hope facilitate a better understanding of not only the reasons for the superficial failure of the embassy in its diplomatic and commercial aims, but also provide insight into the other less obvious dimensions in which it could be said to have had a significant impact and achieved at least some measure of success.

In 1802 a plan was developed by an officer in the employ of the Russian-American company, Lt. Commander Ivan Fyodorovich (Adam Johan) Krusenstern, to supply Russian colonies in Kamchatka, the Aleutian islands and Northwestern America more reliably by sea and at the same to expand trade with China through the port of Canton. This plan was advocated by the director of the Russian-American company Nikolai Petrovich Rezanov and gained the support of two of the Tsar’s key advisors,
the Ministers of the Navy and Commerce. Accordingly, it was decided by the imperial Russian government to dispatch two sailing vessels on an experimental round-the-world voyage (the first one for imperial Russian ships) for such purposes. The Russian emperor Alexander I moreover decided that advantage should be taken of this naval expedition to send a new embassy to Japan. He prevailed upon Rezanov, as a man of distinction, to accept appointment as head of this embassy. To add prestige to the embassy, Rezanov was named a Chamberlain of His Imperial Highness and provided with a retinue of several officials. He was also given much more authority than the previous Russian envoy Adam Laxman had had and put in overall command of the expedition. Krusenstern was relegated to the navigation and command of the ship and the discipline of the sailors, a fact which he greatly resented. Among the personal retinue of Rezanov was the German natural scientist and physician G. H. von Langsdorff.

The main aims of the Russian embassy were stated to be 1) the opening of commercial relations with Japan on the basis of the permit issued to Laxman, (although its meaning was actually ambiguous) 2) the description of the Kuril islands, Sahalin, the Amur estuary and the Strait of Tartary, 3) the investigation of the whole eastern region of Siberia.

Besides Laxman’s permit, the return of four Japanese castaways from Sendai was expected to lend humanitarian justification to the visit of the Russian warship to Nagasaki. An additional
strategy for the success of this first full-scale official embassy was to exalt the status of the Japanese ‘emperor’ [shogun] to be equal to that of the Russian emperor and Rezanov’s rank to that of court chamberlain. However, as we shall see, paradoxically, Rezanov’s perception of his own exalted status as the personal envoy of the Russian Emperor Alexander I, and his extreme devotion to him, as well as the Japanese view of his high rank, would work against the success of his mission.

Rather than relying on Russian shipbuilders, two sailing vessels of the latest design were purchased in London, and outfitted and renamed the Neva and the Nadyezhda (Hope). Both ships left the Russian naval base of Kronstadt in the Baltic Sea in August 1803. In the Pacific en route to Kamchatka a violent dispute broke out between Krusenstern and Rezanov, when the former refused to recognize the latter’s overall command of the expedition, even when presented with documents signed by the Russian emperor himself. After an investigation was conducted by the commandant of Kamchatka, Krusenstern was found to be guilty of insubordination and forced to apologize to Rezanov. In this case, Rezanov seems to have put the fulfillment of his mission to Japan above his own personal honor. However, the insulting treatment by Krusenstern and his subordinate officers and sailors which Rezanov had had to endure seriously impaired his health; this in turn made him more susceptible to the profound ‘culture shock’ and accompanying physical and mental distress he was to experience in Nagasaki.
The _Nadyezhda_, flying the flag of the Imperial Russian navy, carrying the Russian ambassador Chamberlain N. P. Rezanov, entered the outer roadstead of the port of Nagasaki on October 3, 1804. It was, as quoted above, the first official embassy from a European government to Japan in almost 250 years. In addition, it was the first European warship to ever enter a Japanese harbor, the harbinger of the many foreign men-of-war that would encroach more and more frequently and determinedly upon Japanese shores in succeeding decades.²⁰

At his first formal interview with two _banyoshi_ (subordinate officials commissioned by the magistrate) sent aboard the Russian ship late that first evening (October 3) by the Nagasaki magistrate, in answer to their inquiries about his rank, Rezanov proudly replied: “I am one of the closest courtiers of the Russian emperor dispatched as ambassador to His Tenjinkubo Majesty [shogun] to testify how very pleased my Sovereign would be to establish friendly relations with His Majesty; he is returning some of his subjects who were rescued on the shores of his Empire, and I am charged with the task of affirming the eternal friendship between their two great neighboring powers and of establishing a mutually beneficial trade.” Nevertheless, Rezanov asserted that he brought no goods, except gifts for the shogun, and that the Russian ship was a warship, not a merchant vessel.

Even before the Russian ship had anchored a group of officials who had approached his ship in a boat said that after waiting twelve years for a Russian ship to appear they had despaired of
ever seeing the Russians again. They asked why it had taken them so long to return to Japan. Rezanov answered that it was on account of the Napoleonic wars in Europe that they had been unable to return earlier.\textsuperscript{21)

A Significant Clash of Cultures: What humiliation?

After the Japanese castaways were brought forward and interrogated by the officials, Rezanov agreed to allow some of the Dutchmen residing on Dejima to be brought into his cabin. However, it was not until a whole hour had passed before they were called from their boat and shown into his cabin; even though they had arrived before the Japanese they did not dare to board the Russian ship until the chief interpreter had gone to tell them that permission had been granted. Rezanov described this first meeting with his fellow Europeans thusly:

We saw, finally, the opperhoofd of the Dutch factory Mr. [Hendrik] Doeff, his secretary and the captain of the [Dutch] ship Mousquetier coming toward us. They had only just begun to greet me, when the chief interpreter abruptly shouted for the opperhoofd to make a compliment. The interpreter fell onto his knees and bowed, and the Dutch had to do the same, bending at the waist before the banyoshi, placing their hands on their knees, while glancing to the side to see if the interpreter had finished his lengthy speech and whether he permitted them to stand upright again. This [action] was repeated during each conversation
with the banyoshi, and it was extremely distressing to the Dutchmen to have us all as witnesses to their unprecedented degradation.\(^{22}\)

This same encounter was described in much the same vein by the two other main chroniclers of the embassy, Krusenstern and Langsdorff, both of whom were also apparently eyewitnesses to it. It was their descriptions, appearing in English translation, which would shape the dominant Anglo-American view of this cross-cultural encounter for the next fifty years. Krusenstern also noted how the director of the Dutch factory Doeff, the commanders of the two Dutch ships anchored in the harbor, and another Dutchman were kept waiting in their boat for more than an hour before being finally allowed to board the Russian ship. He then described how:

...they had to all stand before the banyoshi several minutes, bowing low, and the following order was given to them through the interpreters. Myn Heer Oberhof! Complement bevore de opper Banios, that is, Mister Opperhoofd, bow before the banyoshi. The latter did not show the slightest sign of recognition of this submissive and humiliating greeting.

Nevertheless, he recognized that even more submissive gestures were required of the Japanese. He explained why these gestures were not demanded of the Dutch, and noted that the Japanese did not venture to require the members of the Russian embassy to
perform them.

The external demonstration of submission by the Dutchmen is not identical to that shown by the native Japanese... Groveling on the ground would be extremely uncomfortable for Dutchmen on account of their tight-fitting clothing and also the inflexibility of their bodies, not accustomed from an early age to such rituals. However, in order to comply as nearly as possible with the customs of the Japanese, the Dutchmen must bow lower than the waist, and maintain that position with arms extended downwards until such time as they receive permission to stand upright again, usually only after several minutes. The Japanese did not dare to subject us to such demeaning acts.\(^{23}\)

This same intercultural encounter as described by Langsdorff focuses primarily on the extremely submissive grovelling (to Western eyes) of the Japanese interpreters before the “Great Man, or Opperbanjos,” while the Dutchmen were also required to bow their heads during the initial ceremony, and to remain in an inclined position until they were told the ‘compliment’ was finished.\(^{24}\)

From the above, it is clear that the perception of this encounter by these three European witnesses was substantially the same. However, it is also evident that Krusenstern, the young imperial
naval officer, was the most indignant at the ‘humiliation’ of the Dutch and also the most militantly opposed to any hint by the Japanese interpreters that he should perform the same ‘demeaning’ ritual.

Rezanov then sat down in his armchair opposite the banyoshi, while his staff officers stood behind him. Finally, he invited Doeff to sit down and asked him about the usual conditions of their life in Japan. Doeff answered that they were confined on Dejima and that the strict surveillance imposed on them defied any explanation. Despite this, whenever any foreign ship appeared in Nagasaki, they were summoned by the magistrate who did not do anything before he had heard their advice, as representatives of a nation that had shown its loyalty to Japan for more than two-hundred years. On the one hand, this sort of Japanese reliance on the Dutch for advice in the case of visits of foreign vessels seems quite credible, and is verified by later Dutch reports. On the other hand, it is contradicted by what Doeff later wrote about his alleged complete lack of influence with the Japanese authorities.

Rezanov then reported that Doeff was suprised to hear that “we succeeded in obtaining permission to trade.” This is consistent with what Doeff later wrote in his recollections of the Russian embassy. Finally, Doeff advised the Russian envoy that in order to achieve the best success, he should promptly comply with Japanese demands, no matter how strange they might appear. After his conversation with Doeff had finished, the
banyoshi asked Rezanov if he would conform to their customs. “With great pleasure,” he replied, “insofar only as they do not prejudice the dignity of my Sovereign.”

Accordingly, Rezanov readily agreed to surrender their gunpowder and their weapons, except for those belonging to the officers and his honor guard. He hoped that the Japanese magnates would be so enlightened that they would not themselves desire to prejudice the dignity of his sovereign, and for that reason he asked them to allow the officers to retain their swords and his honor guard their rifles. All other weapons he declared himself ready to give up with the greatest pleasure. (This contradicts what Hawks wrote, as quoted above.)

Doeff was assigned the task of trying to persuade the Russian envoy to comply fully with the Japanese demands. He told him that among the Dutch, including the ship captains, only he was allowed to wear a sword, as the representative of an entire republic, and warned that his obstinacy might lead to unpleasant consequences.

Rezanov, however, resolutely replied that he would never agree to such demands; their captains were only the commanders of merchant vessels, whereas he was the envoy of a great empire, and that to deprive his officers of the symbols of their rank and him of his honor guard would be as insulting for him as to take away his sword (which he was allowed to keep). For that reason, no amount of persuading would deter him from what he considered to be his just demand.
On the following day, the Japanese interpreters asked Rezanov to go aboard a Japanese boat to pay honor to some subordinate officials of the Nagasaki magistrate sent to represent him. Rezanov refused on the grounds that he would not pay a visit to any official beneath his rank, the only one being equal to him in rank was the magistrate himself. Rezanov’s stubbornness won out, and it was agreed that he would send a delegation of four lower-ranking Russian officers to the boat to greet the Nagasaki officials. These officers then went to the boat and greeted the Japanese officials with the usual European-style bow and returned to their ship. The Japanese officials followed them and were greeted by a roll of drums and presentation of arms by Rezanov’s honor guard when they stepped on to the forecastle. Rezanov waited for them on the staircase leading to the door to his cabin and then led them inside. The officials then seated themselves on the sofa and a chair in Rezanov’s cabin, “all three in the European fashion, not with their legs crossed like our visitors the evening before.” This is the incident which Hawks garbled, and tried to turn to Rezanov’s disadvantage. From Rezanov’s version of it, confirmed by Langsdorff, we see that the three Japanese officials have already begun to accommodate themselves to sitting in the European manner.

After receiving their instructions from the banyoshi on their knees, the interpreters turned around and announced to Rezanov that the Nagasaki magistrate had decided to allow all the Russian officers to wear their swords and the honor guard to retain their
arms. Rezanov expressed his gratitude, saying that he could not expect any other decision from such an enlightened official. Shortly thereafter the opperhoofd Doeff, this time wearing his ceremonial sword on his side, the two captains of the Dutch merchant ships, and the Dutch traveller were shown into the cabin. (The original sources clearly indicate that Rezanov met with the Dutch on two occasions, not only once, as is often claimed.)

They had just entered and scarcely had time to greet me, when the interpreter suddenly turned them around, instructing the baron to make a compliment to the banyoshi. Then all of the Dutchmen stood for a long while bent over, after which with the permission of the Japanese [banyoshi] the interpreter showed them their places, but ordered them to make a compliment beforehand to the banyos sitting at one side. After staying for dinner, the Hollanders took their leave, [and] the chief interpreter again shouted for the opperhoofd to make a compliment. The Hollanders stood about five minutes bent over, and just as the traveller tried to escape from this humiliation, the interpreter shouted for him to make a compliment as well. The traveller thus had to enter the cabin and bend his body over at the waist, as he was told to.\(^{26}\)
Rezanov did not mention for how long they had to maintain this bent over position, but presumably it was for at least a few minutes. From this passage we can see that while the Dutch had to give their ‘compliments’ in semi-Japanese style to the banyoshi, the Russians would only pay their respects with a slight nod in European fashion.

Rezanov later described the prescribed rituals of submission and obedience shown by the Japanese interpreters of Dutch to the banyoshi, and also acknowledged that they seemed much more degrading and servile than those the Dutch were required to perform.

Langsdorff also describes in detail this second meeting with the Dutch, but he is the only one who clearly acknowledges that their seeming ‘humiliation’ was an artifact of their own purely European perspective.

As Mynheer Doeff entered the cabin, he was immediately turning to the ambassador to pay him the proper salutation; but the interpreters took him politely by the arm, turned him aside gently, and said that he must first make a compliment to the Great Men. This was done in a very demeaning manner, according to our ideas, [italics added] as he stood for some time before them with his head bent downwards, and his arms hanging perpendicularly by his sides, not daring on any account to raise his head. As, however, he thought, after awhile, he had kept it in this
position long enough, he turned it half round on one side, and asked the interpreter, *Kan ik wederom opstaan?* May I raise it up again? A like compliment must also be paid to the secretary and the Banjos; and then he was permitted to pay his respects to the ambassador.”

“Towards eleven o’clock, the treasurer and secretary took their leave; but before their departure the Dutchmen were again required to pay a compliment to the *Great Men*. Baron Pabst, who before did not seem to think this attitude of submission altogether consistent with the Dutch character, wanted to have stolen unseen out of the cabin, and escaped the compliment; but the vigilant interpreters called after him: ‘Sir! Mynheer Pabst! You cannot go till you have made the *Great Men* a compliment.’ He was therefore obliged to return, and submit to the humiliating custom.”

The mention of the Dutch traveller Baron Pabst above is interesting in that it suggests that other Dutchmen, who were not employees of the Dutch trading company, nor ship captains engaged in the trade with Japan, were not comfortable performing these peculiar greeting rituals. Krusenstern did not describe this second encounter with the Dutchmen. He only mentioned that during this second visit, “one of the interpreters lightly touched my spine with his hand; but when I glanced backwards and gave him an indignant look, they did not dare to make any such further attempts.” This was certainly the attitude
to be expected of a proud naval officer of his rank and dignity.  

In general, Krusenstern felt that: “It is impossible to regard without indignation the abasement of respected people at the feet of Japanese officials, who sometimes lack any education, and who do not respond to this humiliating demonstration of submission with even the slightest nod of the head.” He further noted that these Japanese officials (banyoshi) were only temporarily granted their exalted status.

“The extraordinary submissiveness with which the interpreters spoke with the banyoshi compelled us in the beginning to think these officials held high status; however, at last, we learned that their rank was in itself not at all elevated. The great respect shown to them continues only as long as they are carrying out the duties assigned to them by the magistrate.”

What Krusenstern especially failed to recognize was the extent to which the Dutch traders on Dejima were integrated into the neo-Confucian inspired social structure and hierarchy of the bakuhan system. The Dutch opperhoofd was recognized as a minor daimyo with the right to have a shogunal audience in Edo. The fact that the Dutch were foreigners excused them from having to make the extreme prostrations that the Japanese daimyo and other lower officials had to perform. As modern, post-Enlightenment educated Europeans, they found these obligatory rituals of submission and obedience to the shogun very boring, and uncomfortable, but they could not really complain that they were ‘humiliating’ as they were not required to do more
than the Japanese themselves, and, in fact, even less.

This is the point of view of Hendrik Doeff as expressed in his Recollections, in which he included a vigorous rebuttal of the critical portrayal of him found in the accounts of Krusenstern and Langsdorff. He noted that the refusal of Rezanov to surrender some of the Russians' arms, while being willing to hand over all of the Russians' gunpowder, seemed odd to the Japanese officials. He considered Rezanov to be “as stubborn in this case as he was unwilling to use forms of Japanese courtesy, which the Japanese interpreters urged him to do.”

According to Doeff, Langsdorff’s account of his meeting with Rezanov and the obligatory ‘compliments’ to the banyoshi, was in some respects lacking in detail, and in other ways simply wrong. It gave the false impression that Doeff had forgotten to respect Japanese customs and the Japanese interpreters had had to remind him to do so. But such a reminder was “truly unnecessary.” As he explained, “During a five-year stay I was thoroughly acquainted with the customs of the country and no interpreter had to bring them to my attention.” He also felt that he didn’t deserve to be made into an object of scorn and ridicule by Langsdorff. “For after all, as Langsdorff acknowledged himself, I rendered essential service to the Russians because as a result of my speech, I was able to assure that their ship could change its anchorage that same evening from a position so dangerous that a strong gust of wind would have thrown it against a cliff.” He also lambasted Krusenstern for his ethnocentrically biased account of
the encounter:

Krusenstern commits the same indecency as Langsdorff, and besides these two, there are a lot of people reproaching the Dutch, and they see it as a self-abasement that they follow the customs and courtesies of Japan. I myself cannot understand in what this self-abasement consists. The courtesies that we use in our relations to Japanese are the same that they use among themselves. They don’t demand from us that we show more respect to their superiors than the Japanese themselves do. The customs of the country are that way, and in whatever part of the world one finds oneself, one has to adapt or agree to the reigning customs and ceremonies. [Otherwise, one need] not go there at all...

After all, one cannot expect that a [host] nation will adjust to the customs of visitors who come in friendship. And so there is nothing abject or degrading in the fact that one follows the customs and courtesies [of a host nation] as long as one is not compelled to express greater submission and inferiority than the members of such a society show to each other. To portray something in a ridiculous light, although it has nothing ridiculous about it, is not very difficult, and one could make fun of the ambassador [Rezanov] himself. But, in that case, I would not direct my scorn at the envoy as at the one who sent him, and my respect for his majesty the emperor of Russia compels me to remain silent.30)
Not only did strict conformity with Japanese customs tend to make Westerners seem ridiculous in the eyes of their fellow Europeans, but their obedience to Japanese prohibitions on communication between Europeans in Nagasaki could even make them seem ‘uncivilized’ to each other. We have seen how an example of the former occurred during the obligatory paying of ‘compliments’ to the *banyoshi*. An instance of the latter can be seen in the prohibition by the Nagasaki magistrate of any free, unregulated communication between members of the Russian embassy, which included Germans and other non-Russian nationalities, and the Dutchmen on Dejima.

After the above-described two encounters between Rezanov and his staff officers and Doeff and his secretary and the two captains of the Dutch ships, no further meetings were allowed between them during the entire six months that the Russian embassy remained in Nagasaki. Nevertheless, the magistrate did permit a limited exchange of correspondence and gifts between Doeff and Rezanov.

It is often mistakenly thought that Rezanov was forced to completely conform to the ‘humiliating’ social customs and ‘ridiculous’ demands of the Japanese. However, this was not at all the case. He was always insistent on maintaining his own dignity as ambassador and would not agree to any Japanese demands that he felt would compromise that dignity. He showed his willingness to compromise and conform to Japanese customs whenever they did not come into conflict with the maintenance of
his own ambassadorial dignity, as defined by his own culture and in particular by his devotion to his sovereign, the Russian emperor. For example, from the very beginning when meeting with the *banyoshi*, he always insisted on sitting in his own armchair, and would not give it up to them, despite their demands to do so.

**Learning about each other: Japanese and Russian Language and Culture**

From the very beginning both sides showed an interest in learning each other's language and acquiring a variety of information about the culture, politics, technology and geography of each country. For his part, Rezanov had already begun learning Japanese from the Japanese castaways on board the ship, and now set about actively acquiring more vocabulary and information about Japanese customs, festivals, and politics. Rezanov showed his interest in Japanese language and culture and evinced a desire to communicate with Japanese directly and intimately from the very first days of his long stay in Nagasaki. He also responded to their eager and insistent requests to be taught Russian. In return, the interpreters are said to have promised to teach him Japanese, although this was strictly forbidden by shogunal edicts.

Responding to shogunal orders, some of the Japanese interpreters of Dutch (*oranda tsuji*) were busily acquiring vocabulary in Russian, asking for names of numerous objects on
the ship. They promised to be able to speak the language in three months, and regretted that Rezanov did not bring them an alphabet. The interpreters pestered the Russian officers about Russian words for things while others wrote them down. Their inquisitiveness, retentive memories, and keenness to learn surprised and impressed Rezanov and his officers. Rezanov thanked them for their efforts in Japanese and officials contrary to custom answered in Japanese to several of his queries in that language. They laughed at his pronunciation, and the interpreters corrected him.

The interpreters also initiated a very concrete dialog about possibilities of trade, asking questions about how many ships the Russians could send, what goods they could bring and how long the voyage would take. The Russians replied that it would take only one month from Kamchatka or Russian America. The Japanese were particularly anxious to understand the relative geographical position of Kamchatka to Japan. They begged to be shown some of the Russians’ maps and demonstrated considerable knowledge of geography. The Japanese were astonished to learn that Russia had colonies in America. Rezanov showed them a pocket globe, which they greatly admired. They knew that the earth was round but had not seen it represented in this way before.  

The chief interpreter Ishibashi Sukezaemon demonstrated more knowledge of world geography than Krusenstern expected him to have but seemed to profess ignorance about the geography of the
Japanese islands themselves. In fact, the interpreters were in the beginning afraid to talk about the geography of the Japanese islands, or their rulers, and the structure of their own government, but by the end of Rezanov’s prolonged stay in Nagasaki, they had become so intimate with and trusting of him, that they confided to him considerable information about it. By doing so, they were violating very strict laws against revealing such information to foreigners, which action could have cost them their lives, if it were reported to higher authorities.

Within a week of the arrival of the Russian embassy, after a Dutch and Japanese translation of the Russian emperor’s letter to shogun, had been made, all the Japanese officials in Nagasaki, from the magistrates on down, learned that Rezanov was not at all a petty naval lieutenant like Laxman, but a high-ranking court chamberlain of Tsar Alexander I. For that reason, the magistrates had ordered that such a distinguished personage from Russia be received with the utmost respect and esteem. Japanese asked him about the orders and ribbons he wore. They reportedly told him of their own bondage and servitude. He showed them portraits of the Russian emperor and empress. Sukezaemon said that he had a portrait of Catherine II wearing a blue ribbon that was obtained from the Dutch. During this time, the Japanese drifters brought back to Japan were presented to the banyoshi dressed in their silk clothes and each with silver watch and twenty ducats given to them by Alexander I.\textsuperscript{32)}

Rezanov asked one of interpreters to write his name for him, and
was surprised when he wrote it in Russian. This was Baba Tamehachiro, who was very happy to be praised by Rezanov. All the interpreters reportedly assured him that they would soon be able to write in Russian. Rezanov promised to compose an alphabet for them to study.\(^{33}\)

On October 16, while the Russian ship was being towed to an anchorage closer to town, the banyoshi stayed on board and asked minute questions again about geography, and wanted to obtain all possible information about the situation, extent and population of the Russian empire. They followed the Russian ship’s route on a map and asked minutely about distances from place to place; they begged to see the pocket globe again that was so much talked about in Nagasaki, and asked a lot of questions about arts and manufactures in Russia. Specimens were shown them. They admired the astronomical instruments, but had no idea how to use them.\(^{34}\)

On November 1 Krusenstern went ashore to the island of Kibachi with several other officers; they were escorted by a multitude of boats with armed soldiers. He made his observations in order to take the altitude of the sun, and took soundings of the creek to see if it was suitable for repairing the ship. The Japanese officials did not oppose them, but were said to be very courteous and kind, and looked on with great curiosity. They politely took up the sextants and examined them with pleasure, explaining that the Dutch did not have such instruments.

On the next day some more Russian officers went ashore to
Kibachi in a sail boat, tacking back and forth against the wind. The guard boats were alarmed by the Russians’ back and forth movements, but calmed down, when they finally realized that the Russians were in fact headed for the shore. The Japanese were very friendly toward them, and showed them how their guns were fired, showed them maps and their medicine boxes, etc. in order to attract their interest and entertain them.\(^{35}\)

On December 24th Rezanov declared that he was dissatisfied with the work of the interpreter Motoki Shozaemon and asked for a different interpreter—Sukezaemon. This strongly suggests that Rezanov by this point understood Japanese well enough to be able to judge the accuracy with which his words were being conveyed. Thus, despite the lack of progress on the diplomatic front, he was making good progress on the linguistic side. On the following day two *banyoshi* came to assure him that his words were being faithfully conveyed to them.

As late as March 25 Rezanov reported that he continued to try to study Japanese from the guard officers. During his fourth audience with the special envoy from Edo and the Nagasaki magistrates, (April 7) Rezanov made the unprecedented request to be addressed by those officials directly in Japanese, thereby bypassing the Japanese interpreters of Dutch (*oranda tsujit*). The interpreters at first told him that that was impossible, but Rezanov eventually prevailed on them to convey his request to the officials, who agreed to converse directly with Rezanov in Japanese. This certainly is indicative of the progress he had made
in Japanese during the several months of his enforced idleness in Nagasaki.

On April 13 Rezanov conversed with three officials from Edo in Japanese in the presence of Tamehachiro; they told him that all Japanese who love their fatherland regret the departure of the Russians. He wrote a Japanese saying in kana on their fans. They said they would report the marvel that the Russian envoy not only speaks Japanese, but can also write it. Rezanov replied that it cannot really be considered a marvel as Russians really love Japanese. The officials drank a glass of wine and reaffirmed how much the Russians were loved in Nagasaki.

**Strictly Confidential: Divulging State Secrets to Foreigners**

On January 3, 1805 the interpreter Tamehachiro confided to Rezanov, when the latter asked him why he must wait so long for an answer from Edo, that the temporal sovereign [shogun] alone could not decide and so an envoy was sent to Miyako to consult with the spiritual emperor [tenno] and as soon as an answer was received from there, a courier would be sent to Nagasaki. He added that the day before a proclamation from the magistrates declared that Russians be considered friends and that Japan was on the best possible terms with Russia. As a result, the fleet of at least forty guard boats of the daimyo of Chikugo was sent back. The Russians indeed saw how all the boats bearing his flag went out to sea. In addition, they observed that the arms of the guard-boats of Hizen were laid aside.
Langsdorff confirmed the substance of this conversation when he reported that the interpreters told Rezanov and his officers in confidence that the answer from Edo was so long in coming because the ‘emperor’ had sent one of his first councillors to the dairi; not being agreed about the reception of the ambassador, they were both conducting intrigues to carry the issue. It was hoped that a decisive answer would arrive in 15–20 days. (January 24)\textsuperscript{37}

Krusenstern also believed that the ‘kubo’ [shogun] would not venture to make a decision in such an important matter as the Russian embassy without consulting with the ‘dairi’ [tenno]. Unlike Rezanov, he did not report any conversation with an interpreter in this regard. As he had little contact with the interpreters, it is likely that he heard a report of Rezanov’s conversation from one of the officers of his retinue, perhaps Langsdorff.\textsuperscript{38}

Then, around the end of January, in response to Rezanov’s exasperation at the long delay in receiving an answer from Edo, Tamehachiro obliged him by telling him “a profound secret.” This was the fact that two hundred of the highest dignitaries had been assembled in Edo to consult together upon the expediency of establishing trade relations with Russia, and that this was the cause of so many delays. The government took it is a fundamental law that everything be done on a solid foundation. In this sense, he thought that the slowness itself was a good sign. At this point, Rezanov must have realized that his embassy had
provoked a ‘great debate’ among the ruling circles of the country, and that the diplomatic success of his embassy hinged upon the outcome.

On March 25 Rezanov reported a conversation with the guard officers about trade; they told him that they would eagerly wait for a Russian ship. They told him that they all desired that and that they loved the Russians more than they themselves perhaps realized. They maligned the interpreters as rogues who loved the Hollanders and hindered the Russians. They were afraid they had said too much, but Rezanov assured them he knew the price of their sincerity. Their comments about the interpreters hindering the Russians certainly do not agree with what the interpreters themselves repeatedly told Rezanov, and with a passion that bespoke sincerity. It would be wise therefore to take these remarks in context.

Rezanov noted that they were critical of their government, and said that they desired to go to Russia, where freedom reigned and the benevolent Alexander sat on the throne, as they had heard from the Japanese drifters. Almost every one of them was willing to be very candid with Rezanov in one-to-one conversation. As they had two emperors, each with their own gifts and faults, he asked them which one was more benevolent. They countered that they had only one emperor, and not two. They told him that the kubo [shogun] was not the tenshi, but only the first daimyo in the country, and that the emperor was tenshi. They claimed that the kubo does not do anything without his approval and sends to
him for confirmation. However, countered Rezanov, if the *kubo* sends an order to you to slit your abdomen, you must obey. Therefore, he must be ruler of all, and is stronger than the *dairi*. The latter is a sacred person, they declared. He is not supposed to occupy himself with secular affairs. He prays to the gods for us, and we are happy by his prayers. Rezanov, seeking further explanation, countered: “But before he ruled over everything.” They finally replied: “Of course, he ruled, but as it pleased the gods.” In the end, they asked to leave the topic and said that it was enough for him to understand that none of them equates the *kubo* with the *tenshi*. Indeed, it was only Westerners, based on Kaempfer’s misleading conception of coequal spiritual and temporal emperors, who thought that. Rezanov had now learned what very few, if any, foreigners knew: what Japanese commoners themselves thought.

On another occasion, Rezanov finally persuaded his guard officer friends to reveal the name of the shogun to him. They told him that it was “Ieri-ko” (Ienari). Whether they left out one syllable deliberately, or whether Rezanov did not hear it, is not clear. Nevertheless, it is a close approximation to his name, with the addition of the honorific title ‘ko,’ (公) and something ordinarily forbidden for foreigners to know.

Rezanov tried to find out more information about the political structure of Japanese government, but was rarely able to have a one-on-one conversation with the guards. Nevertheless, he did obtain accurate information about how the five daimyo were
chosen to serve on the *goroju*, and one selected to head it, and about the three great officials called *gosankisama* [gosankei], who were second in rank to the ‘emperor’ or shogun. They were said to be incomparably higher in rank than the ordinary daimyo, who in turn were higher than the Nagasaki magistrates, who were only *hatamoto*. (March 26)

After being officially informed that the envoy from Edo would arrive in two days, Rezanov spent the remaining part of the day (March 27) chatting with the guard officers. He added to his dictionary and asked as much as he could about morals and customs of their society. He also obtained some information about inheritance customs, and also about the dependence of Ryukyu on the ‘prince of Satsuma’

On March 29 the long-awaited envoy from Edo arrived at noon. The guard officers came in holiday dress in order to congratulate Rezanov on the arrival of the envoy, who would they said spend all day drinking sake with the magistrates. Rezanov chatted with the young guard officers and asked if they wanted to be a daimyo, or a magistrate. They answered that that was impossible, because all such positions, even their own, were hereditary. The guards seemed so flattered by Rezanov’s attention that they reportedly agreed for the first time to let two extra Russians stay onshore—which was against the strict shogunal regulations, and so at considerable risk to themselves, if reported to higher authorities.

The next day (March 30) the guard officers told Rezanov that
they saw an engraved portrait of him, wearing his dress uniform with ribband, and a large hat. They added that many were sent to Miyako and Edo and that the Chinese bought a lot of them and sent them to Nanking with junks going there. He asked them to get him a copy, but they said they couldn’t possibly do that. On March 31 Rezanov chatted as usual with the guard officers and found out some more details of Chinese trade in Nagasaki.39)

On April 1 a guard officer named Sasaki was very candid one-on-one about trade. He assured Rezanov that the interpreters were trying to hinder them, in order to serve the Hollanders, who always generously reward them, but that Japanese merchants desire trade with Russia. He also gave him concrete advice about what articles to bring for trade.

The day after Rezanov had had his farewell audience with the envoy from Edo, Shozaemon said in despair that the interpreters had never expected such a decision. He divulged the secret that Laxman really had been given permission to trade, but it was ambiguous. At that time there were many discussions at the court, but two grandees whose opinions carried great weight insisted that it was to Japan’s advantage to have trade and intercourse with a neighboring power like Russia. Most of the courtiers also thought so. If the Russians had come back in six or even eight years, they would have been received joyfully, but in the sixth year one grandee died, and in the eighth year the last one died, and people of the opposing party took their place. When the Russians finally came, it took a great effort to overturn the
previous opinion, because the emperor [shogun] himself was disposed favorably to Russia. They hurried to summon government ranks, who agreed with the opinion of these grandees; that is why it took six months. However, with the passage of time the previous opinion might again triumph, it was added.

The three senior interpreters told him that they considered the day of refusal a misfortune, and that it may one day be rectified. They told him that changes may be expected, that Rezanov can write to them via the Dutch, who they assured him were favorably inclined to Russia. They maintained that the Dutch had no influence on government affairs, and that Doeff still did not know that the Russians were refused, but would soon be told. Rezanov thanked them for their sincerity. They claimed that nary a person could be found who did not regret the refusal of the Russian proposals, and reminded him that public opinion means a lot everywhere. (April 8)

On April 10 Rezanov spoke Japanese with two senior banyoshi and Shozaemon. The former wanted to know where he had learned Japanese. “Here, sitting behind the bamboos” he replied. “My sincere attachment to your country helped me.” “Rest assured, we will never forget you,” they said. Shozaemon then had a very revealing and somewhat puzzling conversation with Rezanov in private. “You must know now how you were refused, but you should not despair at all, all is subject to change, the people want to enter into trade relations with you, and that must
happen sometime. We will write to you via the Dutch and you can conduct trade together with them.”

“That’s impossible,” Rezanov replied.

“Alright” but when you get our letter, send a good head with Dutch ships. We guarantee that the Dutch will keep this secret, and then we will make a good and general plan. If you hear of a big change in Japan, you can boldly approach our shores under guise of distress to your ship, and then your reception will be from the beginning one of trade, for the government will not miss a chance to rectify its mistake. By the way, don’t forget the north.” Rezanov couldn’t understand what he meant by this statement and the entry of other interpreters into the room at that moment prevented him from clarifying what he meant by it.40)

On April 11 Shozaemon again began in conversation with Rezanov to hatch new plans to establish trade. He thought that in about six years the Russians would reappear and in ten for sure. “That’s not so easy” Rezanov cautioned him. Shozaemon responded that he would apply his cleverness to achieve this goal before he died. He promised that he would write to him every year, candidly, about how to achieve this goal. “You know what a great influence we interpreters here have; the Hollanders must do all that we desire, and you can on basis of my letter send a ship together with the Hollanders. We will force them to request this, and our government will agree to it. Here is the beginning for you.” He said that he was president of the junior interpreters.
When a vacancy occurred he would be promoted to the ranks of the senior interpreters, and by custom assume the presidency of the senior interpreters. He promised that he would exert stronger leadership over the interpreting caste. At the same time, he said that he had suggested to the magistrates, and would continue to do so, how advantageous it would be for Japan to have ties with Russia and how shameful their refusal was, if they don't rectify it. “You write cautiously from your side, but don’t write from the north, about which I reminded you yesterday. Give some time, and you will see, what a person can do, who knows the value of life.” .... “You have in me a true friend of Russia, and all Nagasaki feels the same...The change of only one person is needed, and then all obstacles will be removed.” He would not give the name of this individual, saying it was not necessary for him to know. “Remember that during the whole of your stay here there were changes in your intercourse with us : now too polite, now too cold; you didn’t give any reason for this and must have seen the vacillation of court intrigues, now in your favour, now against you, and we acted towards you as we were ordered to.” He reminded him that while he complained about the lack of freedom and not being allowed to go beyond the bamboo fence, he was only experiencing a temporary deprivation of freedom. In contrast, generations of Japanese must endure it endlessly. “In Japan they do not allow us to have individual feelings.” he said passionately. Rezanov marvelled at his candor. Then Rezanov went outside and thanked the workers, or coolies, who said that
they were glad to serve the Russians, and asked them to come back to Nagasaki. They were driven off, but came back again and asked various questions, such as, how far it was to Russia. They asked Rezanov to give them work, and declared their readiness to serve him. He answered all of them in Japanese, until a junior banyos drove them off in earnest. They only laughed, and then bowed to him from a distance.

On April 12 Tachikiro told Rezanov: “Don’t forget Japan, she loves the Russians; I will write to you.” Then Sukezaemon, the head of all the interpreters told him privately: “Write to us, and we will inform you about everything. Do not suspect the Dutch.” Rezanov replied: “I will write to you in brief, but you may write to me at length.” Unfortunately, because of Rezanov’s untimely death, such a correspondence could never take place. 41)

On April 13 Tamehachiro was even more candid about the political debates and intrigues in Edo and Miyako sparked by the Russians’ arrival, naming names and going into more details. Unfortunately, the names of the lords who were supposedly in favor of trading with the Russians may have been made up, for they cannot be positively linked to any real individuals. Tamehachiro claimed that Laxman had actually been given permission to trade, and that the return of the Russians was impatiently awaited. However, the leader of the pro-Russia faction died, and the opposing faction became stronger.

“The people then wanted trade with you, but you weren’t here, and all was quiet. As soon as you came, the emperor [shogun]
proclaimed his agreement, but one clever lord... stopped the emperor and said that the fundamental laws demand the consent of the *dairi*, and in particular in the case of the establishment in Japan of a new and strong Christian nation. In the court of the *dairi*, or spiritual emperor, he made the suggestion, that the *kubo* is usurping the authority of the latter, that when Laxman was given the permit, the *dairi* was not consulted, which is true... Finally the *dairi* declared that the resolution of such an important matter demanded the consent of government ranks, who, upon gathering, yielded to the intrigues of the clever lord, whose name you should not ask us... I will only tell you that the emperor [shogun] is on your side, but yielded this time so as not to provoke a civil war... So, you see, we in Japan do not keep our word so strictly, and Japanese laws are the same as in other countries, and subject to alteration by cunning minds.”

This sort of candid confession may lack accuracy in certain details, but overall it seems to provide a reasonable picture of the kind of intrigues occurring among the different elements of the political elite. For Rezanov it clearly revealed that there were those among the top leadership who favored dealing with the Russians, including the shogun himself, but, as the latter's power was not absolute, he had had to yield to those opposed to trade with Russia. It foreshadowed the struggle for the restoration of imperial power that would intensify after the signing of the first treaties with the Western powers in the 1850s.

Rezanov then asked Tamehachiro to tell him about
governmental structure in Japan, and the latter obliged him, telling him that the government council consisted of “five first rank councillors and five second rank, goroju and wakatoshi [yori]...” Rezanov then asked if the Hizen ‘prince’ was not a government councillor. Without mentioning the word *tozama*, he explained accurately why he could not be. Then he elucidated the function of the *sankei*, who were not supposed to interfere in the shogunal administration. They may only run the personal affairs of the shogun as his close relatives. He stressed that the *roju* and *wakatoshiyori* were the actual rulers of the government. From this quite accurate account, Rezanov surmised that the so-called Japanese ‘emperor,’ or shogun, was not so autocratic if his top counsellors could frustrate his will.

On April 14 Rezanov was informed about the organization of the Nagasaki interpreters into two classes of senior and junior: *otsuji*, and *kotsuji*, as well as other details concerning their leadership and means of selection. Shozaemon again assured Rezanov that all the interpreters would make every effort to establish trade. He mentioned that he and another interpreter may perhaps go to Edo next year to lobby on the Russians’ behalf. “Public opinion is already in your favor; we will spread it from south to north.” Rezanov asked him to explain more clearly about his previous. ‘north’ comment, but the latter only laughed and said that he would never receive an answer to such a question.

Rezanov asked him for the name of the ‘clever lord’ who had insisted that the imperial court in Kyoto be consulted about the
important issue of establishing trade relations with Russia. Tamehachiro hesitated for a long time, but finally did provide his name and that of the province he ruled. However, once again neither can be definitively linked with a real individual. It seems that he was endeavouring to please Rezanov, but at the same time protecting himself from being accused of the capital crime of divulging such secrets to foreigners. Nevertheless, Tamehachiro implored Rezanov not to mention what he had said to the other interpreters as it would spell his doom.

Their conversation was again broken off by the arrival of two Edo functionaries who told him how unpleasant it was for them to part from such people who have earned the affection and respect of all. Finally, one of them, taking his hand, said: “We take our leave from you. but we will take to Edo that good opinion which the Russians have here earned.” Shozaemon then let him know with his eyes how great was his success. Rezanov spoke with the Edo officials in Japanese, and they were delighted by it: “What a pity that they cannot hear our conversation in Edo.”

The Nagasaki official said without any apprehension as well that the refusal of the Russians elicited the disgust of all the people, for all—from the highest to the lowest—are certain that the Russians are kind people. The Edo functionaries confirmed that this was true, saying that every Japanese must feel the same way, and also vouching for the daimyo and the magistrates. “What to do?” answered Rezanov, “that the good intention of my sovereign
was not accepted here, even though it would have been for your own advantage.\(^{42}\)

On April 16 the majority of guard officers told Rezanov sincerely that they themselves did not understand Japanese laws, that the whole town regrets that the Russians were refused, and that the reasons were not publicized. They gave him their fans to autograph and promised to keep them as souvenirs of the embassy of such a great monarch. Rezanov wrote on the wall in Japanese that the Russian envoy thanks the kind Japanese for their friendship, which he will never forget.

On the morning of April 17 the senior interpreters came and said that they would write to Russia via the Dutch, who want to see you in Japan. “Do you know that only recently they again began to send two ships here? Their trade suffered for seven years; war with England did not let them send ships here, except one small one, and then finally their own, but under American flag. Then the government was on your side, and if you had only come, you would have been very glad.” Dutch trade had indeed suffered during those years, and American and other ships had had to be hired to carry trading goods. If a Russian ship had come during that time, this passage strongly suggests that it could have been either disguised as a Dutch one, or perhaps even admitted to trade on the basis of the Nagasaki permit.

They added that upon the death of the ‘clever minister’ or in case of other changes, they would write openly. Then he can send one or two Russians via Batavia, who can live on Dejima
disguised as Hollanders. The Dutch are willing to keep it a secret, but it is necessary that Batavia be on the side of Russia. “When you send one person here with a good head, then we can tell him openly, for with the Dutch we can interact more freely. Then you can go to Kamchatka and send a ship from there to approach our shores. A kind reception will then be assured by the fact that the government is ready to rectify its mistake and begin substantive talks.

Rezanov was skeptical of such schemes, but the interpreters assured him that as the Russians were being allowed to leave despite Japanese laws, how can the talks not be substantive? If they go to Matsumae for talks, they would not get anywhere, but in Nagasaki all the interpreters are ready to do the Russians’ bidding. He thanked them for the advice, and judged all their plans to be feasible.\(^{43}\)

**Demonstrating Western Scientific Progress: Electron Rushes and Hot Air Balloons**

In order to educate and entertain the Japanese officials who came to visit, Doctor Langsdorff demonstrated the use of an electrical machine and conducted various experiments, which they appreciated. Indeed, Langsdorff noted that this machine was “the object which more than any other attracted the attention, and excited the astonishment of the Japanese. Very rarely did a banjos... come to visit us, without desiring to feel the effect of the electricity, or to see some experiments.” (December 22) \(^{44}\)
On January 15 toward evening Langsdorff launched a hot air balloon. It was 50 feet in circumference and rose up into the air very well. The Japanese officers were very glad to see such a spectacle and appreciative of the experiment. The Russians also conducted some electrical experiments for the edification and entertainment of the interpreters, which both surprised and gratified them.

Three days later some Japanese guards came with a request to launch another balloon. Langsdorff willingly did so. The balloon rose very well, but the rope got tangled with roof and it flew horizontally into the bay. Japanese boats brought it back soaking wet, and it was a big job to repair it.\footnote{[45]}

On February 6 Langsdorff requested permission to launch a large hot air balloon again. On one side was a sketch of the two-headed eagle, and on the other the monogram of the Russian emperor with his crown, and other decorations. Rezanov gave his approval after the interpreters had assured him several times that the whole town would be glad to see it. The balloon rose up very high and flew over the whole town, but got a little rent in the upper part and fell onto the roof of a merchant. The burning spirit in the globe caught fire and so much smoke issued from it, that people thought it was a fireball. The merchant, feeling alarmed by it, tried to douse it with water. It was taken to the magistrate who had been forewarned by the interpreters. He proved to be a reasonable man and no disagreeable consequences ensued. He merely sent word to Rezanov that the next time it
should be launched when the wind was blowing out to sea.\textsuperscript{46)}

**Cross-Cultural Dialogs: What confinement?**

All of the conversations that Rezanov conducted with his Japanese counterparts were by nature intercultural. However, some of them were of particular interest for the sharp contrast that they presented in cultural values and political ideology. As his Japanese skills improved, he was probably able to converse on more complex topics.

On February 7 Rezanov reported a very meaningful conversation with Shozaemon about some of the cultural differences between Japanese and Europeans. Rezanov tried to persuade Shozaemon to incline the shogunate to act more humanely toward foreigners. He expressed surprise that they dealt with the Russians in such a way and do not ameliorate their harsh confinement. To this Shozaemon replied with a smile “What confinement? It’s only a ritual” “What do you mean--ritual? It’s involuntary and very cruel,” countered Rezanov.

“Involuntary, to sit only for a while, while we are deprived of freedom for a whole century, and don’t get bored. By the way, I will add that we waited for you for twelve years and didn’t get bored. So what does it cost you to show a little patience?”

Rezanov then told him that the Russians wanted at least as much freedom as the Dutch. Shozaemon answered that they waited seven years before they were granted this kindness by the shogun. Rezanov thanked him sarcastically and said he would
prefer to return to Russia. Shozaemon said that he was free to return whenever he wished, but that the magistrate would have to first issue a permit to leave the port, and that there would likely be serious obstacles. So, in fact, Rezanov was not ‘free’ to go in the Western understanding of that term. This was an essential point of difference which separated the two sides.

Shozaemon confessed that he was perhaps incautious in what he said, but that this was useful to Rezanov and that he would one day give his sincerity its just due. He wanted to counsel him that only by patience would he win. Rezanov thanked him for his advice, and said that some portion of patience remained to him, but given his worsening condition of health he wondered if he could imagine how much his expended patience had cost him. Shozaemon greatly sympathized with his position and regretted that Japanese laws are such that no Europeans like them. Rezanov was dissatisfied nevertheless with his reply, but took his leave of him as well as he could, and they finally parted as friends.\(^{47}\)

On April 13 Tamehachiro promised to bring Rezanov a *jibiki* even though it is potentially a capital crime to do so. He must rely on his discretion. Rezanov told him that perhaps the time had come to rid themselves of their ‘empty fears.’ The latter laughed but told him that he was afraid to talk with him. “Do not be afraid,” Rezanov told him, “the Russians will show you the path to happiness” \([\text{italics added}]\)

One wonders exactly what Rezanov could have meant by this
statement. Was he suggesting that the Russian emperor might send an even larger embassy that would compel the shogunate to open its ports to Russian influence? Was he recommending a Russian type of autocratic government for Japan? It is interesting to speculate, but impossible to know exactly what he meant. However, it seems certain that he thought that Russia could fulfill the role of ‘teacher’ to the Japanese, not only for certain technical skills, but in the larger sense of pointing out the way to a happier and more fulfilling life. In fact, Russia would in later years fulfill the role of ‘teacher’ to the Japanese in shipbuilding skills, among other areas.

**Clash of Ideologies: the domestic impact of the Rezanov embassy**

At the most fundamental level, the more than six-month encounter between Russians and Japanese in Nagasaki in 1804–5 represented a profound clash of civilizations and their contrasting values. The dominant neo-Confucian philosophy with its emphasis on the performance of rites and rituals in recognition of a vertical hierarchy of greater and lesser men, which formed the ideological underpinnings of the shogunate, was challenged by the belief in the worth and dignity of each individual human being and the equality between human beings that was inspired by the writers of the recent European Enlightenment and the slogans of the French revolution. The clash of these opposing values can be seen repeatedly in the conversations between Rezanov and his officers with the Japanese officials with whom they had almost daily
contact in Nagasaki over the entire period of their stay there.

The Rezanov embassy suddenly presented a still feudalistic and Confucianist Japan with the modern Western model of international relations between different sovereign and equal states. That the Japanese political elite was not able to suddenly embrace this new revolutionary model, abandoning the traditional one, should come as no surprise to anyone conscious of the generally reactionary role of vested interests in any society. As we have seen, when the opinion of the imperial court in Kyoto was sought, its opposition allegedly turned the balance of opinion against Rezanov. In effect, the Russian embassy had provoked a sort of ‘constitutional crisis’ wherein the proclaimed ‘ancestral laws’ substituted for the lack of a formal constitution, and demanded to be upheld in the same way. To initiate Western-style diplomatic and commercial relations with Russia, would have necessitated the violation of those same ancestral laws, which took the place of a formal constitution. This was also the opinion of Hendrik Doeff, as quoted below, who spent almost two decades in Japan, the longest tenure by far of any Dutch opperhoofd on Dejima.

The shogunate justly feared the potential affect on the country and its own claim to legitimacy, if Japanese ports other than Nagasaki were opened to foreign ships, besides those of Holland. They justly felt that it would bring about changes that would lead to the demise of Tokugawa governance. Indeed, when the shogunate did finally reluctantly agree to fully join the Western
treaty system, in 1858, it would last only ten more years. That is why Okuma could assert with reason that the ultimate necessity of opening the country to full diplomatic and commercial relations with the advanced Western nations was first demonstrated to a significant portion of Japan’s intellectual elite by the Rezanov embassy. That such an opening took fifty and more years to accomplish should come as no surprise, given the radical revolution in cultural attitudes towards foreign intercourse required, as outlined by Gibney (1985), against the background of profound conservatism and intense patriotism of the great majority of Japanese intellectuals of the day. Nevertheless, it is important to remember that there were undoubtedly many who were genuinely in favor of trading with the Russians. These included the magistrates, higher and lower officials, interpreters, merchants and other inhabitants of Nagasaki, as well as those of other cities, who stood to benefit from trade with Russia. Because of the Napoleonic wars in Europe, the Dutch had been unable to send any trading ships to Japan for several years, which meant a great financial loss to the citizens of Nagasaki. Thinking that trade with Russia could have made up for that lack, it is little wonder why the great majority of inhabitants of Nagasaki would have been disappointed and dissatisfied with the shogunate’s decision to completely reject the Rezanov embassy.

Seen in a larger context, contact with Russia in the late 18th to early 19th centuries was undoubtedly instrumental in making
Japanese leaders aware that their country’s long isolation might soon be ended. However, the Russian proposal to establish diplomatic relations in 1804 came fifty years too early. The linguistic and cultural, ideological and political barriers proved to be insurmountable. If Rezanov had been willing to act humbly and obediently like the Dutch traders on Dejima had been doing for almost 200 years, Russian ships might have been permitted to share or supplement the Dutch trade, with the essential cooperation of Doeff and the Dutch interpreters. However, Rezanov’s emphasis on his high diplomatic status as courtier and personal ambassador of the Russian emperor, rather than on his position as head of the Russian-American company, made such an arrangement impossible, as he himself told the interpreter Shozaemon. It also probably doomed his mission from the beginning. For in order for the shogunate to initiate diplomatic relations with a foreign empire, it would have had to violate its own laws that prohibit Japanese from travelling abroad. It would have also had to reverse the dominant trend toward sakoku first pronounced by Sadanobu in reply to Laxman.

While both the unofficial mission of Laxman and the official embassy of Rezanov failed to achieve their commercial and diplomatic aims, they did succeed, albeit unintentionally, in shaping the determinedly isolationist foreign policy of the shogunate for the next half century. As a result, all subsequent Western expeditions to Japan were subjected to the same exclusionary foreign policy that the mission of Laxman had
forced the shogunal leaders to enunciate, and the embassy of Rezanov had compelled them to make even more explicit.

This policy was again spelled out to Golovnin and Rikord when the former was finally released from his two-year captivity in 1813. After the peaceful resolution of that incident, Russia would have no further official contacts with Japan for forty years. British whalers appearing off the coasts of Japan, and sometimes making illegal landings, then became the primary foreign nuisance and threat to Japanese isolation in the 1810s and 1820s. It was their activities which prompted the bakufu to take the extreme measure of issuing its expulsion edict in 1825. This was the most extreme development of the policy of sakoku, in which the bakufu committed itself to a policy of indiscriminately firing upon and driving off any foreign ships that approached Japanese ports (besides Nagasaki.)

However, this order was rescinded in 1842 in the wake of the Opium war, and thenceforth the policy reverted to the former one of offering foreign ships fuel and provisions, and then requesting that they depart Japanese shores. With the arrival of powerful steam-driven naval squadrons from America, Russia, Britain and the Netherlands beginning in 1853, coupled with their insistent demands to open ports, the traditional policy of sakoku became untenable, and a consensus toward kaikoku gradually emerged among the Japanese political and intellectual elite.
Clash of Civilizations: The Impact on the Western Image of Japan and of the Dutch on Dejima

While the shogunate wished to maintain the carefully designed social order on which its legitimacy and stability rested, the outside world, in particular, the Western world, was undergoing rapid changes in almost all aspects of life. Despite these far-reaching changes, the shogun's representatives in Nagasaki attempted to induce the Russians to follow the example of the Dutch traders on Dejima, who in their old-fashioned dress and quaint, humble manners seemed to represent a bygone era in Europe. Needless to say, the Russians refused to imitate the Dutch and greatly resented any attempts on the part of the Japanese to force them to do so. Post-Enlightenment educated Europeans had been inculcated with the ideas of individual worth and dignity and so would not abase themselves before other men. Indeed, Rezanov wrote that he did not even bow to God, except in his own mind.

By the beginning of the 19th century, Westerners had become more culturally assertive as the knowledge of nature gained through scientific investigation bestowed power over nature and over other nations. The industrial and scientific revolutions had reinforced the conviction by many Westerners of their cultural superiority, whose reverse side was a disdain for the customs of non-Western nations. This in turn made it difficult to comply with foreign customs that seemed to compromise their own culturally-engrained sense of dignity and self-worth.
At the same time the philosophical movement in Japan known as *kokugaku*, which instilled in its adherents a conviction of the innate superiority of Japanese culture relative to all others, was becoming more influential. As a result, the perceived threat from a Christian West was seen to endanger Japan at a more elemental spiritual level, as well, and the necessity to prevent its influence from entering the country became even more imperative. This development set the stage for an ideological face-off between Japan and the West, each claiming cultural and ethnic superiority for themselves.\(^{48}\)

As we have seen, both Western and Japanese scholars of the Rezanov embassy have indicated its domestic impact on shogunal foreign policy, and in particular how it served to elucidate and consolidate the shogunal policy of *sakoku*. However, no scholar of this embassy to my knowledge, whether Western or Japanese, has yet drawn attention to the great impact that the descriptive accounts of this embassy had on the formation of Western, in particular Anglo-American, views of it. I have in mind specifically the aforementioned accounts of Krusenstern and Langsdorff published in English translations in London in 1813 and 1817, respectively, which were widely read, and served to form a very negative impression of Japanese political culture in general, and in particular of the seemingly shameful, and slavish obedience shown by their fellow ‘enlightened’ Europeans, the Dutch, in the performance of ‘humiliating’ rituals to lowly officials in Nagasaki. This was the kind of impression that reinforced by subsequent
sensational stories would fuel resentment, breed indignation and gradually ‘agitate’ the Western world, in the same sense of the word as used by Okuma, until the American and Russian governments were eventually moved to send new naval expeditions and diplomatic missions to Japan in 1852.

The Dutch had already long been the objects of ridicule for their supposed denial of their Christian faith and ritualistic ‘trampling on the cross.’ In his satirical *Gulliver’s Travels* (1726) Jonathan Swift sent his eponymous hero to Japan, the only real country among the fantastic nations of Lilliput, Brobdingnag and others, where he claimed to be a Dutch merchant and asked to be transported to Nangasac (Nagasaki). His request to be excused, however, from the obligatory ritual of ‘trampling upon the Crucifix’ elicited real surprise from the ‘emperor’ as he was the first Dutchman ‘Who ever made any Scruple in this Point.’ Nevertheless, he granted his request but warned him to act as though he had merely forgotten to do so, for if the Dutch learned that he had been excused from doing it they would cut his throat. This may be rich satire, but it is poor history. In fact, the Dutch were never themselves required to ‘trample on the crucifix’ as the Japanese residents of Nagasaki were. Perhaps this is but literary revenge for the reputation they enjoyed among the English as ‘cut-throat’ businessmen.\(^{49}\)

Now in post-Enlightenment Europe they were derided as overtly secular, avaricious traders servilely sacrificing their individual worth and dignity to an Oriental despotism for the
sake of commercial gain. This negative view was voiced by the influential *Quarterly Review* in 1818 commenting on the recent visit of the British ship *The Brothers* (Capt. Gordon) to Japan (Uraga) and remarking that the “Dutchmen on Dejima are not the best specimens of Christian Europe.” This comment was made in the wake of the publication of Krusenstern’s and Langsdorff’s accounts in English translations in London. It is very likely that the author of these comments had read, or at least heard about the passages in those two books relating to the stay of the Russian embassy in Nagasaki and the allegedly ‘humiliating’ conditions the Dutch residing there were subjected to.

From this time on the reputation of the Dutch plummeted even more, along with the notoriety of the port of Nagasaki, where Europeans were supposedly subjected to ‘cruel commands’ and ‘ridiculous demands,’ incarcerated as virtual ‘state prisoners’ and in the case of Rezanov compelled to wait several months in that demeaning condition, only to be refused any trading privileges, prohibited from any further contacts, and ignominiously sent away. It was this very negative image of Japan’s only ‘open’ port, however distorted or exaggerated, which would dominate the perceptions of Europeans and Americans for the next fifty years and help to instill a much more militant, intolerant and impatient approach to the larger question of opening Japanese ports to Western ships and trade.

Along with the need to open those ports, was the strong desire to end the ‘unfair’ Dutch monopoly on trade with Japan, and at
the same time establish a new Western presence in Japan that was emphatically not modelled on the unquestioning obedience to the Japanese shogun of the 17th century VOC.

The accounts of Commodore Perry, Admiral Putiatin and the officers and sailors who accompanied them to Japan in 1853 and 1854 are remarkable for the number of references to the previous embassy of Rezanov, as well as to the subsequent Russian raids on Japanese settlements in the Kurils and Sahalin, and the two-year captivity of Golovnin and several other Russians, both of which had their origins in the failure of that embassy to establish regular and formal relations with Japan. Golovnin's famous narrative of his captivity appeared in English translation in London in 1818, and served to further disseminate and reinforce an unfavorable image of the Japanese as cruel captors and torturers of Europeans. This was despite the fact that Golovnin's account itself was overall very balanced, detailing the many instances of kindness and solicitousness shown to him and his compatriots by both higher and lower officials, soldiers and commoners alike.

In short, the Rezanov embassy, and its related incidents as mentioned above, acted as an essential point of reference by which to determine one's own approach, and judge its degree of success, for the American and Russian naval expeditions which appeared in Japanese ports a half-century later. His knowledge of the long confinement which Rezanov had to endure, as well as the ‘humiliating’ incarceration on Dejima and the ‘demeaning’ rituals
that the Dutch in Nagasaki were made to perform, is undoubtedly a major reason why Perry absolutely refused to go to Nagasaki. Putiatin also did not want to go there for those reasons, and but for last-minute supplementary orders from the Russian government, would have taken his squadron to Uraga, as Perry did. During the negotiations about the protocol to be followed for his first visit to the Nagasaki magistrate's office, Putiatin rebuffed the attempt by the Japanese to use the Rezanov embassy as a precedent. However, in general, Putiatin adopted Rezanov's principle of following Japanese customs insofar as that was consistent with the maintenance of his own dignity, as defined by Russian customs.

In terms of the topics for discussion and negotiation between the Japanese diplomats and their Western counterparts, virtually all the issues that brought Perry and Putiatin to Japan were first brought up, and discussed between Rezanov and the Japanese interpreters of Dutch and the banyoshi in Nagasaki. As examples of this, one could cite articles of trade, samples of manufactured items and the humane treatment of victims of shipwreck. The topic of coal for steamships would be one outstanding exception. In addition, Perry and Putiatin were also very insistent that their high naval rank and status as plenipotentiary emissaries of their respective governments be recognized and went ashore with all due pomp and ceremony. However, neither showed much interest in learning Japanese, and little appreciation of Japanese culture, other than in acquiring lacquerware and other souvenirs. In short,
Rezanov was both a model and anti-model for both Perry and Putiatin fifty years later.

**Critiques of the Rezanov Embassy: Some Contemporary Voices**

On the Japanese side, voices were raised both for and against the decision by the government in Edo to rebuff Rezanov. The artist Shiba Kokan criticized the shogunate for keeping the Russian envoy waiting for six months in Nagasaki, and treating him very discourteously and even inhumanely. He argued in favor of trade with Russia, given that rice was both cheap and abundant in Japan. Selling this surplus grain to the Russians would raise its price and thereby benefit the samurai class, and also provide funds to develop Ezo.

The explorer of the northern frontiers of Japan, Mogami Tokunai, on hearing of rejection of Russian embassy, wrote that people all over the country sympathized with the Russians. This is similar to what the Nagasaki interpreters told Rezanov repeatedly at the end of his stay there.

Though he actually dreaded foreign intercourse, Aoki Okikatsu, acknowledged as “the grandfather of Dutch studies (rangaku) in the Chikuzen fief,” felt that Rezanov should not be turned down flatly, but that a promise of trade fifty years hence should be held out to him, a suggestion almost prophetic in calculation, since Japan’s first treaty with a Western power was to be signed in 1854. From the above, it may be easy to form the misleading impression that the number of Japanese intellectuals protesting
against the Russians’ rejection were greater. But Kisaki claims that the voices in support of the decision were actually more numerous.\textsuperscript{50}

In any case, Rezanov would certainly have laughed at Aoki’s proposal in 1805. In fact, no European emissary would have been satisfied with an offer of trade in 50 years. It would have seemed far more like a ‘No’ than even remotely like a ‘Yes.’ That Aoki was not alone in holding these views is borne out by the fact that a policy of deliberate delay was what emerged among shogunal ruling circles after the arrival of Perry and Putiatin in 1853. Only by then, the promise of ‘fifty’ years had been reduced to ‘five’ years, a much more reasonable and acceptable figure.

**Conclusion: Some important remaining questions**

1) Could Rezanov, on any other ambassador, have succeeded?

There are two ways of looking at this question--either the Rezanov embassy failed because it had not come earlier, when the pro-Russia party was predominant, or it failed because it had come much too early. The Japanese interpreters of Dutch in their intimate conversations with Rezanov stressed the former reason, but Doeff laid emphasis on the the latter. My personal view on this question is very close to that of the Dutch factor. Like him, I believe that even if some of the shogunal leadership, including the shogun himself, were in favor of dealing with the Russians, by that time the influence of the ideology of ‘national learning’
(kokugaku) had grown to such an extent that the authority of the shogunate to decide such vital questions was being seriously undermined. This meant that those who questioned the legitimacy of the shogunate and its right to rule would have insisted on consulting the imperial court in Kyoto, who, in this case, probably welcomed the opportunity for domestic political reasons, to oppose any departure from the supposed ‘ancestral laws’ governing Japan’s exclusionism. As mentioned above, these were the informal equivalent of a national constitution, which, of course, no nation could be expected to overturn before the most serious deliberations had been devoted to the question. That is in essence why Rezanov was kept waiting for so long, while a sort of ‘constitutional crisis’ was occurring. Rezanov and his compatriots had entered a very different world from Europe, where diplomatic and commercial ‘friendly’ relations between different sovereign states were taken fully for granted. In Japan, what was taken for granted was just the opposite idea: that no true friendship between nations of unequal size and strength and contrastive customs was possible. Therefore, it was better not to have relations of any kind, unless like the Dutch and Chinese traders in Nagasaki, they could be treated as vassals and all their actions fully regulated and controlled by the shogunal agents there.

Interpreted in this way, it is easy to see why Okuma had been moved to make such a judgement on the significance of the Rezanov embassy. It was the first full-scale attempt to induce Japan to abandon its ‘ancestral laws’ serving as a de facto
Constitution in order to join the Western diplomatic and commercial system. That the embassy failed should be ascribed much more to the near impossibility of the task than to ambassador Rezanov’s shortcomings as a leader and negotiator. That his was truly a ‘mission impossible’ is supported by the fact that what he sought to obtain would not be achieved until the West was in a position to project much greater military and political power in far east Asia. The conclusion of the commercial treaties with the five major Western powers in 1858 and the opening of official diplomatic and commercial relations the following year were only achieved in that historical context.

In fact, Rezanov’s exalted rank and insistence on respect in accord with it, and desire for diplomatic relations with Tokugawa Japan made approval of trade along the lines of that already established by the Dutch to be so much more difficult. The Russian emperor Alexander I had invested his personal prestige in the embassy and its success. As the ambassador and personal representative of his beloved sovereign, Rezanov was acutely sensitive to any slights or indignities he felt were directed towards him. This keen awareness of his exalted status as the personal emissary of the Russian emperor must have rendered it all but impossible for Rezanov to willingly conform to Tokugawa cultural norms and forms of etiquette like the Dutch traders on Dejima, setting aside European cultural norms and attitudes. If he had been so able to, the Russian-American company might have been given a share of the Dutch trade, or even permitted to trade
on its own. The key requirement would have been to fit into the Tokugawa social order, like the Dutch. The Dutch were of course foreigners, but they were also an integral part of the Tokugawa political system, which lent prestige to the shogun and the entire Tokugawa ruling apparatus.

2) Can the Dutch be blamed for sabotaging the Russian mission?  
   Attributing the failure of the Rezanov embassy to Dutch intrigues behind the scenes has been a very common theme among Western writers since Hawks (1856). Both Krusenstern and Langsdorff are reported to have favored that interpretation. It seems to have been given documentary evidence in the form of a letter written by the Dutch factor to his superiors in Batavia, which was intercepted by the British. In it Doeff was alleged to have boasted of having dissuaded the Japanese from agreeing to deal with Rezanov. However, Doeff claims that he only reported this fact, taking no credit for himself. Almost one hundred years later, Harrison (1953) alleged in reference to Rezanov: “He did not know that the Dutch were making every effort to block the success of his mission.” However, he offers no concrete reference and no credible evidence for such an assertion. Furthermore, it is flatly contradicted by ample and convincing testimony by the Nagasaki interpreters of Dutch, as well as Doeff and Rezanov themselves. To his credit, Lensen (1959) offers this explanation as only one among competing alternatives. More recently the Russo-Japanese historian Togawa Tsuguo has argued that this
traditional interpretation needs to be reexamined. This is an opinion that I emphatically concur with.

From Rezanov’s diary we learn that Rezanov was himself quite satisfied that his rejection owed nothing to Dutch intrigues behind the scenes. On the contrary, he considered them his staunch allies. He does not go into the specific details about why he thought so, but he does mention that he continued a secret correspondence with Doeff in French throughout his stay there with the connivance of the Japanese interpreters. We do not know what the content of this correspondence was except for two phrases that Doeff himself revealed, as quoted below.

We also know from his diary that Rezanov had wanted to meet with Doeff again on the day of his departure from his residence at Umegasaki, but that he was denied permission to do so. Doeff also must have had a cordial regard for the Russian ambassador, given his solicitous attention to him during his entire stay.

As for Doeff’s stance toward the Russian mission, I consider what he later wrote in his book to be a sincere statement. His arguments seem logical and convincing to me. In contrast, although I have often read about how he allegedly sabotaged the Russian mission, I have never seen any concrete evidence of Doeff’s intrigues against the Russians. As he himself said, it might well have had the opposite effect.

As mentioned previously, the three senior interpreters assured Rezanov (April 8) that the Dutch were favorably inclined to Russia. They also maintained that the Dutch had no influence on
government affairs.

Rezanov sent his thanks for the presents to the Dutch factor Doeff via Sukezaemon and asked him to assure him that he did not in the least suspect the Hollanders, and knows that there is not the least benefit for them in damaging the Russians’ interests.\footnote{53}

Although Doeff denied that he played any role in it, the complete rejection of the Russian proposals that occurred at the audience on April 5 came as no surprise to him.

The refusal to negotiate with the embassy and to enter into a close relations with Russia, was foreseen by all who had any knowledge of Japan. The laws, customs and mores of this people do not allow to enter into ties of friendship and trade with other nations...as became clear from the reply of the court. Until the fundamental laws of the state, by which Japan has fared so well for two centuries, are repealed, all such proposals from any nation will receive a negative reply.

If we Dutchmen were not settled there already, we would never be allowed in, and if we were not protected by the permit of the great Gongen, the author of the basic law (constitution) now in effect, they would have surely got rid of us a long time ago.

Doeff could not presume that the Japanese were allowing the Dutch traders to remain in Japan on account of the profits they brought to the shogunate. He thought that the Dutch trade was
only advantageous to the magistrates and inhabitants of Nagasaki. Moreover, he felt that Japan had no real need for foreign imports, whether of foodstuffs, or metals, or cotton cloth, or of the luxury goods and other trifles the Dutch brought them.

Because of the closure of the country to all but a few foreigners, and the prohibition against Japanese leaving it, the Japanese did not consider objects of luxury to be necessities, and so did not feel the lack of them. Thus, he felt that the assertion in the letter to Rezanov that Japan could easily do without foreign trade was reasonable. Having lived in Japan for almost nineteen years, Doeff was thoroughly convinced that this was true.

Doeff took upon himself to answer other accusations made against him in the travel accounts of Langsdorff and Krusenstern that were widely read in Europe. “...can the failure of the Russian embassy which became known in Europe through travel accounts of Langsdorff and Krusenstern justifiably be ascribed to the Dutch and especially to me.? One has to acknowledge that it would be ridiculous for me to take steps with the Japanese government to prevent the granting of access to the Russians because I knew and had seen the year before that the laws of the empire prohibit trade with foreigners, as one sees affirmed yet again in Golovnin’s adventures.”54)

Doeff saw no reason to assume that the Edo government would grant trading privileges to the Russians in 1804, having denied them to the enigmatic Captain Stewart in 1803, as such privileges would contradict the basic law of the empire. Doeff argued
cogently that even if he had actively opposed the Russian petition for trade, the shogunal leaders would not have paid any attention to his views, if they had seen it to be in the interest of the country to depart from the ancestral laws and establish trade relations with Russia. For that reason, he stated that he did not involve himself in this case either in writing or orally and maintained complete silence on the issue. “For I surely knew that even the granting of access to Russia could not have harmed the Dutch interests, with whom the Japanese have lived in friendship for two centuries.” He does not elaborate on this point, yet it is curious that so many other Western writers seem to assume just the opposite: that any trading privileges granted to Russia would naturally be to the disadvantage of the Dutch. This may have been true in a previous era, but at that time, when there were very few Dutch ships available to carry cargo to Japan, the participation of Russian ships could have been distinctly to their advantage, just as American and other ships were being used in that way.

As for the less than optimal accommodation offered to Rezanov, and the long delay in dispatching an envoy from Edo with the reply to his proposals, Doeff commented that “...it is clear that the refusal of Mr. Rezanov to adapt to Japanese customs as well as to hand over the muskets, can have been a reason for the delay in permission for the embassy to go ashore, as well as of the strange and unsuitable residence that they were given.” As for the rejection of his proposals, Doeff nevertheless concluded that even
if “he would have submitted humbly in a reasonable way, he would still have failed to achieve the main objective of his trip.”

Doeff attested to the fact that “The ambassador [Rezanov] was engaged in a very amicable correspondence with me. And on a certain occasion, when I had sent a present to his excellency, he thanked me in the name of all the Russians with these words: “Upon my return to Europe, I will not fail to recommend you to my august Master.” This surely indicates that Rezanov was very favorably inclined toward him.

Rezanov later wrote a note to Doeff which seemed to completely exonerate him from any suspicion of intrigues against the Russians. “Although things turned out badly, nothing can be attributed to our Batavian [Dutch] allies.” Doeff felt that he had written these words in all sincerity.

Indeed, unless Doeff was so cleverly manipulating things behind the scenes that Rezanov had no inkling of it, he could not have uttered these words. Of course, there is no independent confirmation that he said them, but the consistently cordial attitude toward Doeff evident from his journal, certainly lends the ring of truth to them. Furthermore, given Rezanov’s apparently intimate relations with the Nagasaki interpreters of Dutch, it is highly unlikely that none of them would have breathed a word about Doeff’s intrigues against him, if he was in fact so inclined.

While preparing to leave, Rezanov desired to pay a farewell visit to Doeff on Dejima, but even this reasonable request was denied, as was that of Doeff to visit him at Umegasaki. The Dutch
raised a flag on their balcony, and they and the Russians had to content themselves with greeting each other from a distance. When Rezanov and his entourage passed by Dejima on board of the barge belonging to the daimyo of Chikugo, “The Russians gave us unambiguous signs of satisfaction and friendship with us,” Doeff later fondly recalled.⁵⁶)

3) What is the legacy of the Rezanov embassy to Nagasaki?

While the West was preparing to accelerate in the direction of ever-wider commercial and political intercourse under the newly-harnessed power of steam-driven machines, the shogunate was determinedly attempting to pull a changing Japan in the opposite direction, towards greater isolation and insulation from further social change. Eventually these two tendencies would come up against each in a test of strength and wills, as in the proverbial encounter of irresistible force against immovable object. Although the ambitious aims of the Rezanov embassy were premature by half a century, it helped to accelerate intellectual currents and cultural and political forces both in and outside Japan that would eventually render that object more movable than it appeared to be at first glance and from a distance.

In addition, when one takes into account the fifty odd years from the arrival of the Russian naval squadron under Admiral Putiatin in 1853 up until the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese war in 1904, one is even less able to dismiss the Rezanov embassy as a
total failure, and to belittle, as Krusentern did, the declarations of affection and friendship made repeatedly to Rezanov by the Nagasaki interpreters and other officials during his prolonged stay in Nagasaki. Even the war did not put an end to the mutual affection and respect shared between Russians and Japanese in Nagasaki on a personal level. Postcards depicting Rezanov in his full-dress uniform with his ribband across his chest and wearing a large hat, modern variants of the prints that his guards told him about, are still popular souvenir items in Nagasaki, and elsewhere in Japan. To this day, his portrait and a sketch of the Russian ship are kept under glass in the archives of the Nagasaki Museum of History and Culture.

The leaders of the shogunate in Edo and the court in Kyoto who opposed establishing commercial relations with Russia may have thought that the rejection of the Rezanov embassy was the end of the matter. If so, they were mistaken. It was actually only the beginning of a long, stormy, on-again, off-again, love-hate relationship, combining attraction and fear, admiration and derision to varying degrees over different periods that would continue up to the present day. The Laxman mission personally introduced Russia and Russians to Japan and laid a basis for future friendship; the Rezanov embassy brought the first large party of Russians to Nagasaki, the epicenter of Japanese foreign relations at that time, and made an indelible and lasting impression. It sowed the seeds of a special relationship of friendly intimacy and mutual respect that would blossom a half century
later. Although Rezanov had failed in his primary aim to initiate trade relations with Japan, he had succeeded in several other important aspects, whether intentionally or not. Although Rezanov, and the other leaders of the expedition, still did not fully understand Japan, and its strange customs and laws, they had engaged in many dialogs with their Japanese counterparts which put them on the path toward a better mutual comprehension. At the very least, and without the slightest doubt, it can be said that after the Rezanov embassy, Russians and Japanese were no longer strangers to each other. Indeed, even after the *Nadyezhda* had sailed out to sea, fond memories of the Russians and other Europeans would have been likely to linger in the hearts and minds of many of those who dealt with them in Nagasaki for months and years to come. In many cases, these memories would be passed on to their descendants, such that in later years Russians and their ships would hear welcoming voices and be offered a safe haven and a second home in the tranquil inlets and verdant hills of Nagasaki.

**Notes**

1) The portion of the diary that dealt with the voyage before its arrival in Nagasaki was published in serial form in *Otiechestvennye zapiski* (1822–25).

2) It is believed that the Tsarist censors suppressed it because of the light it shed on the reasons for the failure of the embassy. Ito Hidemasa believes that it was kept from publication by the Soviet authorities until after the collapse of the Soviet Union out of fear of its possible effect on the Russo-Japanese territorial problem.
The English version of Krusenstern’s book is often not a faithful rendering from the original Russian. Some key words have clearly been mistranslated, and some passages perhaps even altered to make them more critical of ambassador Rezanov, and the Japanese interpreters. Therefore, the quotations in this article are my own translation from the original Russian.


Francis Hawks, Introduction to *Narrative of the Expedition of an American Squadron to the China Seas and Japan*, (Washington, D.C., 1856,) pp. 45–6

Lensen, p. 160


15) 宮地正人『国際政治下の近代日本—近現代』(Tokyo, 1987), p. 9
20) Lensen, pp. 126–8, 132–6
22) Rezanov, p. 123
23) Ivan Fyodorovich Krusenstern, in *Otiechestvu poleznym byt': pervye russkie krugosvetnye plavaniia* (Vladivostok, 1987), p. 107
25) Rezanov, pp. 124–5
26) Langsdorff, p. 228; Rezanov, pp. 125–127
27) Langsdorff, Ibid., pp. 231–33 This book contains an illustration wherein Japanese officials are depicted in the same posture as the Dutch were required to assume, with their body bent at the waist, forming a right angle to the ground.
28) Krusenstern, pp. 107–8, 110
29) Krusenstern, p. 108
30) Hendrik Doeff, *Herinneringen, uit Japan* (Haarlem, 1833) pp. 88–91. Doeff’s rebuttal of the criticisms directed against him have received little attention in the English-speaking world. One reason for this neglect could be connected with the fact that a complete English translation of this book did not appear in print until 2003.
31) Rezanov, pp. 128–30; Langsdorff, pp. 237–38
32) Langsdorff, pp. 241, 243
33) Rezanov, pp. 136–7, 139
34) Langsdorff, pp. 246–7
35) Rezanov, p. 148; Langsdorff, pp. 262–3
36) Rezanov, p. 170; Langsdorff, p. 286
Neither of these first two balloon launches were reported in Langsdorff’s account.

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